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I. INTRODUCTION 
A sense of anguish had replaced the exuberance typical of the heart of the İstanbul district Beşiktaş. Streets that normally bustled with 
lively commotion sulked beneath banners, mourn-
ing martyrs, and decrying complacency. The football 
matches and boisterous cheers that usually roared 
from nearby bars drowned under the cries of protes-
tors calling on the Turkish state to recognize and 
account for massacres that have occurred throughout 
its history. Although the police officers surrounding 
this protest only observed silently, violent clashes 
erupted between protestors and security forces else-
where in the city.1 The protests across İstanbul and 
the rest of Turkey on that hot July day commemo-
rated the Sivas massacre, a 1993 incident in which 
thirty-seven individuals—most of whom were Alevi 
intellectuals and artists—perished in a hotel set on 
fire by a fundamentalist Sunni mob during an Alevi 
cultural festival.2
Only a short walk from this tense protest, how-
ever, I encountered a strikingly different portrayal 
of relations between the Turkish state and the Alevi 
population. At the top of a steep hill in a nearby park 
stood a nondescript building, its presence revealed 
only by an occasional stream of people passing 
through its doors or a small group of children playing 
in its courtyard. Conversations with local residents 
taught me that the modest building was a cemevi, a 
house of worship and center of community organiz-
ing for Alevi communities. While its plain exterior 
and lack of minarets distinguished the cemevi from 
the grandiose mosques found across the city, it was 
its interior that would truly impress upon me the gulf 
separating Alevism from the Sunni Islam observed 
by the majority of the Turkish population and the 
complicated relationship between the Turkish state 
and the Alevi population. Alongside portraits of the 
religious figures Imam Ali and Hacı Bektaş Veli hung 
a portrait of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the founder of 
the Republic of Turkey.3 Having witnessed the fiery 
protests on the anniversary of the Sivas massacre, this 
reverence for a figure so central to the Turkish state 
struck me as a seeming contradiction.
Indeed, the Alevi population occupies a per-
plexing place in modern Turkey. An estimated twenty 
percent of the population, the Alevis comprise the 
second largest religious community in Turkey after 
Sunni Muslims and one of its largest minorities, 
alongside the Kurds.4 Despite the large proportion 
of the population that adheres to Alevism, the beliefs 
and practices of the Sunni majority sharply diverge 
from those of the Alevi population. Whereas Sunni 
practitioners pray separated by gender in mosques 
led by imams trained by the state, Alevi men and 
women pray alongside one another in cemevis under 
the leadership of the dede (literally “grandfather”), 
a figure determined by familial lineages of spiritual 
authority.5 Beyond these forms of worship, Alevis re-
vere a number of Shi’i and Sufi figures not recognized 
in Sunni Islam, such as Imam Ali and Hacı Bektaş 
Veli, and disregard many of the rituals and tradi-
tions held sacred by Sunni Muslims, such as the daily 
prayers and pilgrimage to Mecca.6 Alevis often attri-
bute these differences to the emphasis Alevism places 
on the allegorical and hidden dimensions of Islam, 
rather than the legalistic and literal Sunni tradi-
tion.7  As a result of these differences, the position of 
Alevism within Islam has proven controversial, with 
some even contending that it is a separate religion.8
These religious divisions have inspired political 
tensions. As one of the largest groups to migrate from 
Anatolia to the cities of western Turkey, Alevis have 
grown increasingly visible in the country’s public and 
political life in recent decades. This greater presence 
in Turkish society, coupled with the emergence of 
the Alevi revival movement in the 1980s, has exacer-
bated historical tensions between the Alevi popula-
tion and the state that stretch back into the Ottoman 
period as Alevis demand official recognition and 
accommodation similar to those received by Sunni 
Islam.9 Due to increased pressure from the secular 
opposition and the European Union in addition to 
the Alevi revival movement itself, the Turkish state 
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has haltingly sought rapprochement with the Alevi 
population, first in 2007 with the “Alevi Opening,” a 
series of workshops initiated by the dominant Adalet 
ve Kalkınma Partisi (“Justice and Development Party,” 
hereafter referred to as the “AKP”) that aimed to 
address Alevi grievances, but was ultimately con-
demned as a failure.10 Despite such moves, discrimi-
nation by the state and resistance by the Alevi popu-
lation continue.
Scholars turn to Turkish nationalism in order 
to better understand the contradictory behavior of 
the state toward its Alevi population. Although the 
new state, built atop the ruins of the fallen Ottoman 
Empire, was declared a secular republic, scholars 
conclude that the nation designed by that state took 
on an ethnic and religious identity—specifically, a 
Turkish and Sunni one. As such, scholar of citizen-
ship and identity in Turkey Başak İnce notes that, al-
though Turkish nationalism “appear[s] to be defined 
as political nationalism based upon citizenship…in 
reality an ethno-cultural nationalism based upon race 
is promoted,”11 while scholar of Turkish nationalism 
Şener Aktürk argues that the modern Turkish nation 
is a continuation of the Muslim millet from the Otto-
man period, a legal Muslim community that imposed 
a Hanefi interpretation of Sunni Islam on all Muslims 
in the Empire.12 Recognizing Alevis as ethnic Turks 
but religious outsiders allows the state to portray the 
Alevis as, Aykan Erdemir writes, a “noble savage,” the 
bearer of a genuine Turkish cultural tradition who 
is nonetheless mired in antiquated superstition.13 
Reflecting on these conflicting views of the Alevi 
population, Fethi Açikel and Kazim Ateş describe 
Alevis as “ambivalent citizens” subject to “constant 
oscillation… between genuine selfness and heretical 
otherness… a symptom of lack of recognition, but at 
the same time… a symptom of lack of total exclu-
sion.”14 But while scholars explore the attitude of the 
Turkish state toward the Alevi population at length, 
only a few examine the response of the Alevi revival 
movement to the nationalism that shapes identity 
politics and state policy in Turkey.
In this article, I seek to address this gap in the 
literature by analyzing the identity formation process 
within the Alevi revival movement as a response to 
Turkish nation-building policies. To do so, I ad-
dress the following question: to achieve recognition 
by Turkish state and society, does the Alevi revival 
movement pursue assimilation and present Alevi 
identity as a facet of the Turkish and Sunni identity 
privileged by the state, or does it pursue resistance 
and challenged the state as a minority whose dif-
ferences must be respected? Simply put, do Alevis 
respond to their ambivalent position in the Turkish 
nation as insiders or outsiders?
At first glance, it appears that the Alevi revival 
movement does both. Many symbols and narratives 
employed by the movement locate Alevism within 
an ethnic conceptualization of Turkish identity and 
identify Alevi beliefs with civic values. At the same 
time, however, Alevis resist assimilation by empha-
sizing the stark differences between Alevi beliefs and 
practices and those of the Sunni Islam supported by 
the state.15 Yet these seemingly contradictory ap-
proaches do not reflect an ambivalent response. In 
fact, the movement asserts that Alevis are an inte-
gral component of the Turkish nation rather than a 
minority outside of it.16 In doing so, Alevi leaders 
and institutions contest the meaning of the Turkish 
nation itself, arguing that the religious dimension of 
the Turkish identity fostered by the state is an aberra-
tion from the legitimate Turkish nation liberated by 
Atatürk. This true nation, the movement contends, is 
one grounded in Turkish culture and ethnicity, and 
shaped by civic values and secular principles. 
As symbols are fundamental to the identity 
formation processes of social movements, such as the 
Alevi revival movement, in the first chapter, I seek 
to analyze what a symbol is. I begin the chapter by 
reviewing the relevant literature to arrive at a suit-
able definition of symbols. With this understanding, 
I then examine how states use symbols to construct 
national or majoritarian identities and how minority 
groups excluded from those identities respond. This 
analysis leads me to three courses of action available 
to responding minority groups: assimilation, exit, or 
resistance.17 This assessment offers us frameworks to 
understand the processes of identity formation at the 
levels of the Turkish state as it constructs a national 
identity and the Alevi revival movement as it re-
sponds with an Alevi identity.
In the second chapter, I build on this under-
standing of symbols and identity in an examination 
of the symbols and narratives available to the Alevi 
revival movement by reviewing the historical devel-
opment of the Alevi population. I examine three pe-
riods of time: the Ottoman period during which the 
heterodox sects that would later give rise to modern 
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Alevism took shape in Anatolia; the early Republican 
period, stretching from the collapse of the Ottoman 
Empire at the end of the First World War to the de-
mocratization of Turkish politics in 1950; and the de-
cades following democratization, a period marked by 
the resurgence of religion in public and political life 
and the ascent of identity-based movements, includ-
ing the Alevi revival movement. This review offers a 
greater context of the relationship between the Alevi 
population and the state and an understanding of the 
symbols available to the Alevi revival movement as it 
articulates an Alevi identity.
Having described this history and its resulting 
symbols, I analyze Turkish nationalism in the third 
chapter. Turkish nationalism is articulated through 
two distinct understandings of identity, one ethnic 
Turkish and the other Sunni. What interests us here 
is not only how the state constructs identity, but also 
how the population perceives and responds to that 
identity. While scholarly literature recognizes the 
ethnic and religious components of Turkish national-
ism, there is a third component absent from policy 
but present in official rhetoric, a civic nationalism. In 
understanding national identity as political and rhe-
torical influence on the population, I offer a modified 
model of Turkish nationalism.
In the fourth and final chapter, I return to the 
Alevi revival movement. To examine Alevi identity 
as a response to Turkish nationalism, I turn to the 
symbols utilized by the movement in the political 
demands articulated by Alevi leaders, the cultural 
figures and narratives lifted from history by Alevi 
institutions, the poetry written by Alevi intellectuals, 
and the beliefs and practices promoted by Alevi lead-
ers. This analysis of the substance of Alevi identity 
reveals instances of both assimilation and resistance, 
oftentimes by the same actors within the movement. 
Although these processes seem contradictory at first, 
a more careful reading reveals that they complement 
one another as the Alevi revival movement contests 
the meaning of Turkish identity. Disputing the role 
of religion in Turkish nationalism as an aberration 
from the nation liberated and led by Atatürk, the 
movement depicts a nation defined by civic values, 
secular principles, and a Turkish ethnic and cultural 
heritage—a nation in which the Alevis are a central 
component. With the growing prominence of the 
Alevi population in Turkish politics, an understand-
ing of the Alevis is critical to an understanding of 
modern Turkey.
ii. theories and symbols of identity
Scholar of nationalism Ernest Gellner once 
remarked that “one of the most important traits 
of a modern society” is “cultural homogeneity, the 
capacity for context-free communication, the stan-
dardization of expression and comprehension.”18 The 
cultural homogeneity Gellner describes results from 
a shared symbolic discourse, a common cultural lan-
guage that unifies the experiences, values, and beliefs 
of a people. Yet despite the prominence of symbols 
in literature examining identity, symbol as a term 
has become diluted and problematic. Reviewing this 
literature, Zdislaw Mach thus observes that although 
“[i]t has become commonplace that…we think and 
express our thoughts and feelings through symbols, 
and that culture is a symbolic construction… the 
concept of symbol is not clearly defined and is un-
derstood in many different ways.”19 In this chapter, I 
develop a definition of symbols that will allow us to 
better understand the processes of identity formation 
occurring at the levels of the Turkish state and the 
Alevi revival movement.
a. Symbols
Two aspects comprise a symbol: an image that 
provides its form and a concept that defines its mean-
ing. Whereas the image is simple and readily under-
stood, the complex, abstract concept that it signifies 
proves more evasive. C. J. Jung thus considers an 
image “symbolic when it means more than it denotes 
or expresses…has a wider ‘unconscious’ aspect—an 
aspect that can never be precisely defined or fully 
explained.”20 Because of this distance between the 
image and the concept, Roland Barthes describes the 
image as “analogical and inadequate” for the concept, 
going on to write that, for example, “Christianity ‘ou-
truns’ the cross.”21 As such, the concepts that symbols 
communicate escape words due to their nuances, 
subtleties, and intricacies but can be conveyed or 
implied through imagery. Although the traditions, 
narratives, and values that comprise Christianity are 
expansive and surpass the cross in significance, the 
cross succinctly expresses the essential meaning and 
ideas of Christianity. This disparity between the sim-
plicity of the image and the complexity of its implica-
tions defines the symbol and gives it importance.
Despite the importance of symbols in com-
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munication, their meanings are not constant. Frank 
Hartung writes that, “the meaning [of a symbol] is 
derived from its [sociohistorical] context, and can-
not be derived from either its physical qualities or the 
sensory experience that it may cause.”22 A cross on 
its own does not convey the concepts associated with 
Christianity; rather, it has been adopted as a symbol 
of Christianity due to its role in Christian narratives. 
Further, for those without access to the narratives 
that give the cross symbolic meaning for Christians, 
the cross has no religious significance. An image 
may gain symbolic meaning through happenstance 
or historical incidents, as is the case with the cross 
and Christianity, or a social or cultural group may 
deliberately seize upon a symbol and transform the 
meanings associated with it. For example, though 
Mount Fuji was originally a sacred icon particular 
to the religious traditions of its immediate region, it 
was later adopted by the Meiji state as a symbol of 
Japanese ethnic identity and the triumph of Japan 
over foreign domination.23 This fluidity of symbols is 
significant for identity formation as it allows social or 
cultural groups to develop images that communicate 
the content of their identities.
In addition to communicating the content of 
identity, symbols also delineate its boundaries. Stuart 
Hall explains that the process of identity formation 
“operates across difference, it entails discursive work, 
the binding and marking of symbolic boundaries.”24 
Boundaries are necessary as, Hall continues, “iden-
tities can function as points of identification and 
attachment only because of their capacity to exclude, 
to leave out… Every identity has at its ‘margin’ an 
excess, something more,” that excess being what he 
refers to as the “constitutive outside,” the cultural 
other against which a group defines itself.25 As it 
symbolizes the narrative of Christianity, the cross 
suggests that those who do not follow that narrative 
are not Christian. Similarly, Mount Fuji defines the 
constitutive outside of Japanese identity as “foreign,” 
that is, those who are not ethnically Japanese. Sym-
bols thus not only communicate what an identity is, 
but also what it is not.
b. States and Nations
In the contemporary world, nationalism has 
emerged as the predominant force by which states 
cultivate popular loyalty. Gellner offers one of the 
most enduring definitions of nationalism: “a political 
principle, which holds that the political and the na-
tional unit should be congruent…a theory of political 
legitimacy, which requires that ethnic boundaries 
should not cut across political ones.”26 What results 
from this principle, Benedict Anderson writes, is 
an “imagined political community,” an understand-
ing among a population that it is united by a shared 
national identity that is realized in a nation-state.27 
Nationalism legitimizes the state and communicates 
its power as it is seen as the political and territorial 
manifestation of the nation. As a result of this legiti-
macy, it is in the interest of the state to construct a 
cohesive and homogenous nation.
The state thus acts as the agent of nationalism, 
developing the symbols that build national identity 
and propagating them throughout society in order to 
construct what Geisler calls a “shared mythic past,” 
a narrative that presents citizens as part of a histori-
cal community that ultimately culminates with the 
state.28 The symbols that compose national identity 
are drawn from historical or cultural sources and 
constructed by the state itself, as Eric Hobsbawm ex-
plains: “[e]xisting customary traditional practices…
[are] modified, ritualized and institutionalized for the 
new national purposes” and “entirely new symbols 
and devices [come] into existence as part of national 
movements and states, such as the national anthem…
the national flag…or the personification of ‘the na-
tion’ in symbol or image.”29 The variety of symbols 
employed by states building nations is vast, demon-
strated by the following expansive list of examples 
offered by Anthony Smith: 
flags, anthems, parades, coinage, capital cities, 
oaths, folk costumes, museums of folklore, war 
memorials, ceremonies of remembrance for the 
national dead, passports, frontiers… national 
recreations, the countryside, popular heroes and 
heroines, fairy tales, forms of etiquette, styles of 
architecture, arts and crafts, modes of town plan-
ning, legal procedures, educational practices and 
military codes…30
These symbols crystallize identities around attributes 
such as religion, ethnicity, civic values, or territory, 
and tether these attributes to historical and cultural 
narratives.31 These narratives, in turn, cultivate feel-
ings of loyalty among citizens by placing them within 
a shared community bound together by a grandiose 
past and represented by the state, thus creating the 
nation.
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Despite the diversity of the symbols and attri-
butes that compose national identity, there are only 
two fundamental varieties of nations. In his study 
of nationalism, Rogers Brubaker describes these 
types as a “state-centered and assimilationist” French 
model of nationalism and a “Volk-centered and dif-
ferentialist” German model of nationalism.32 The 
French model, he writes, is grounded in “a political 
and territorial conception of nationhood,” which as-
serts “that the state can turn strangers into citizens, 
peasants—or immigrant workers—into Frenchmen” 
through assimilation into a set of values and norms.33 
As such, the state develops symbols that emphasize 
social and political values and the state as the center 
of national identity rather than ascriptive character-
istics such as ethnicity, seeking to create what Cécile 
Laborde describes as a “superior public identity” that 
requires citizens to “not only to leave behind, but 
often transcend, their particularisms.”34 In contrast, 
the German model is based on ascriptive character-
istics, the particularisms that the French model seeks 
to escape. In German nationalist thought, Brubaker 
writes, “nations are conceived as historically rooted, 
organically developed individualities, united by a 
distinctive Volksgeist and by its infinitely ramifying 
expression in language, custom, law, culture, and the 
state.”35 One cannot assimilate into the German na-
tion as descent determines membership. Whereas the 
state stands at the center of the French nation, Smith 
explains that the ethnic nationalism of German 
thought “start[s] from a pre-existent homogenous 
entity, a recognizable cultural unit,” and desires that 
a state protect and privilege that group.36 Accord-
ingly, the symbols found in the German model seek 
to create ancient communities bound by blood and 
history.37 Whereas membership in the French civic 
nation is accessible to any individual who supports 
the values of the state, birth determines membership 
in the German ethnic nation.
c. Minority Groups and Movements
Of course, not all nationalist movements obtain 
their own states, and the borders of states rarely align 
with their supposed nations. One need not look 
further than Turkey, where the Kurdish nationalist 
movement contests the state for greater political au-
tonomy, to understand that Gellner’s understanding 
of the nation-state as a congruence of the boundaries 
of the nation and that the state is more an ideal than 
a reality.38 Discrepancies between the boundaries of 
the nation and the state produce minority groups—
those groups whose identities place them outside the 
national or majoritarian identity privileged by the 
state. Three courses of identity are available to minor-
ity groups confronted with this dilemma: assimila-
tion, exit, and resistance.39
A minority group that pursues assimilation 
seeks to renounce attributes that separate it from the 
national or majoritarian identity or emphasize its 
attributes that are congruent with that identity. In 
some cases, members of the minority group reject 
the minority identity in its entirety and wholeheart-
edly adopt the symbols and values of the national 
or majoritarian identity.40 Members of the minor-
ity group may also pursue only partial assimilation, 
abandoning certain aspects of the minority identity 
while preserving others that are significant or not in 
conflict with the national or majoritarian identity.41 
Nimmi Hutnik describes these individuals as those 
“who may be well acculturated or even assimilated 
into the surrounding culture, but who may neverthe-
less feel very strongly identified with their ethnic mi-
nority group in terms of their self-categorization.”42 
Yet assimilation is not always possible. If a national 
or majoritarian identity is grounded in ascriptive 
attributes, such as ethnicity or religion, individuals 
without those traits cannot assimilate. Even some 
supposedly civic nations exclude individuals based 
on such attributes, one prominent example being 
the repression of African-American citizens in the 
United States.43
A minority group that either refuses or is de-
nied assimilation may choose to exit the nation-state. 
If mobility is not a barrier, members of the minority 
group may physically exit and move to a more ac-
cepting place.44 Physical exit is not always an option, 
however, as the minority group may not have suf-
ficient resources, or the land the minority group in-
habits may have cultural or historical significance.45 
When physical exit is not an option, the minority 
group may pursue secession, which allows the group 
to exit the nation-state while retaining its territory, 
but requires it to legitimize its claims to statehood, 
convince the international community to support its 
claims, and wrest control of the territory from the 
nation-state—all difficult tasks.46 Instead of exiting 
through emigration or secession, the minority group 
may pursue sociocultural exit by remaining within 
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the boundaries of the nation-state but exiting public 
and political life by isolating themselves into cultural 
enclaves or masking their identities with dissimula-
tive practices.
Minority groups may also pursue resistance by 
articulating an identity distinct from the nation or 
majority and demanding accommodation from the 
state. The nature of these demands varies with the 
situation of the minority group, its level of organi-
zation, and its relationship with the state. In many 
cases, the minority group may only pursue limited 
objectives, such as autonomy in sociocultural mat-
ters like the language of instruction in schools in 
its territory.47 In some cases, however, the minority 
group may demand and obtain great autonomy, seen 
with the devolution of political power in the United 
Kingdom.48 To challenge the state for accommoda-
tion, the minority group must construct an identity 
and build a movement around that identity capable 
of challenging the state. Critical for the success of this 
process of identity formation is the development of 
social and political networks. Often grounded in re-
ligious associations and cultural organizations, these 
networks act similarly to a state as they articulate 
the content of identity, propagate their own symbols, 
and provide the structure necessary to mobilize the 
minority group.49
Resisting minority groups develop the symbols 
that constitute minority identity through three meth-
ods. First, the minority group may draw symbols 
from the attributes that separate it from the nation 
or majority, such as language, religion, or ethnicity.50 
Second, symbols may emerge out of interactions 
between the minority group and the state or majority, 
which are often repressive or violent acts. These sym-
bols build solidarity among members of the attacked 
group, direct outrage from the incident toward the 
state, and legitimize claims that the minority group 
needs accommodation to defend itself.51 Third, the 
minority group may contest symbols used by the 
state or majority, particularly symbols that denigrate 
the minority group, through means such as the recla-
mation of terms or images. These methods of symbol 
production cultivate feelings of solidarity among 
the minority group and mobilize it as a movement 
capable of challenging the state.
Symbols are critical for identity formation. For 
states building nations, symbols comprise the foun-
dation of national identity as they forge notions of 
solidarity among citizens and loyalty toward the state 
as the representation of the people. For minority 
groups building movements in resistance, symbols 
allow the minority group to distinguish itself from 
the national or majoritarian identity. This chapter 
offers frameworks through which we can analyze the 
nation-building policies of the Turkish state and the 
identity formation process of the Alevi revival move-
ment. In constructing a nation, the Turkish state may 
pursue an inclusive civic nation or an exclusive ethnic 
nation. In responding to that nation-building pro-
cess, the Alevi revival movement may pursue assimi-
lation, exit, or resistance. In the next chapter, I offer 
a review of the historical development of the Alevi 
population in Turkey in order to describe the poten-
tial symbols available to the Alevi revival movement 
and give greater context to the modern relations 
between the Turkish state and the Alevi population.
III. THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF ALEVISM
Before examining the historical development of 
Alevism, it is important to acknowledge that the term 
Alevi does not refer to a single, monolithic group, 
but rather to a multitude of groups that emerged in 
Anatolia in the late Seljuk and early Ottoman peri-
ods. The term Alevi encompasses groups as varied as 
the Kurds of Dersim, who suffered violent reprisals 
by the Turkish state shortly after the war of inde-
pendence; the followers of the Mevlevi order, who 
enjoyed privileged relations with Ottoman elites; 
and the nomadic Turkmen tribes, who warred with 
the Ottoman state. Ideological and political cleav-
ages continue to fragment the Alevi population as 
their institutions struggle to find a shared definition 
of their identity.52 Since a comprehensive analysis of 
these varied groups exceeds the scope of this work, 
I focus on the historical and cultural developments 
that broadly affected the groups now considered to 
comprise the Alevi population.
a. Islamic Heterodoxy in the Ottoman Empire
As much of the pre-Islamic traditions of the 
Turkic peoples persist in modern Alevi beliefs and 
practices, distinguishing Alevis from Sunnis, it is 
necessary to first examine the ancestral traditions 
of the Turkic peoples that migrated into Anatolia. 
These traditions were characterized by the belief 
in the immanence of divinity in all things and the 
veneration of nature.53 From these animistic beliefs 
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emerged the “shaman,” a religious leader who per-
formed rituals, provided medical treatment, and 
served as an intermediary between the living and the 
dead.54 As nomadic peoples who migrated along the 
trade routes of Asia, the Turkic peoples encountered 
Neoplatonism, Christianity, Manichaeism, Zoroas-
trianism, and Buddhism, among other religious and 
philosophical systems.55 This legacy remains visible 
in Alevism, reflected in Hülya Küçük’s observa-
tion that, “incarnation, metamorphosis, battles with 
dragons and some motifs from the fire cult heavily 
influence these religions” while “‘watch your hand, 
tongue and sperm,’ one of the main moral principles 
of Bekāshism, is no different from the ‘Three Seals’ in 
Manichaeism.”56
Fluidity and syncretism thus defined the ap-
proach of the Turkic peoples to religions they en-
countered, and Islam proved no exception. As the 
Turkic tribes that migrated into Anatolia in the medi-
eval period converted to Islam, striking similarities 
emerged between the Turkic shamans and the Islamic 
mystics of Anatolia: they wore outfits adorned with 
similar religious iconography, were both associated 
with miracles connected to nature, and performed 
shamanistic rituals even in opposition to Islamic 
tenets.57 In addition to this continuation of pre-
Islamic practices, these Islamic mystics adopted the 
syncretism of the Turkic traditions. The mystic poet 
Muhammad Jalal al-Din Balkhi (popularly known 
as Rumi), for example, asserted that truth exists in 
all religions.58 M. Hakan Yavuz similarly describes 
the Islam that emerged from these developments as 
“nonliteral and inclusive,” one that emphasized belief 
over ritual and love over law.59
With time, the syncretic traditions surrounding 
these wandering mystics coalesced into a number 
of orders (tarikats). High levels of variation already 
existed among the orders, with some more closely 
adhering to orthodox interpretations of Sunni Islam 
and others more wholeheartedly embracing the 
pre-Islamic Turkic traditions. Nevertheless, all of the 
orders generally exhibited the syncretic and fluid per-
spective of a “nonliteral and inclusive” Islam. Certain 
orders remained rural, flourishing among the Turkic 
tribes of central Anatolia and defined by secrecy and 
a mistrust of centralized governance. Other orders 
emerged in the urban centers of the Ottoman Em-
pire, constructing highly developed organizations 
and enjoying elite patronage.60 These more urban 
orders exercised strong influence on the state despite 
ideological conflict with the Sunni ulema, as Küçük 
explains that “mysticism [became] a main element in 
the thought of the Ottoman intellectual elite and was 
not confined to the popular beliefs of the Sufi or-
ders.”61 The more syncretic and mystic Bektaşi order, 
for example, gained popularity among the elite Janis-
sary corps as it expanded deep into the Balkans.62 
The Mevlevi order enjoyed similar prestige among 
Ottoman bureaucrats.63 Despite a then-nominal sup-
port for the Hanefi interpretation of Sunni Islam, the 
Anatolian heterodoxies enjoyed wide support among 
both rural populations and urban elites.
However, relations between the orders and 
the state would eventually sour. As the rural orders 
viewed the centralized state with suspicion, economic 
distress or political disputes often inspired rebel-
lions in the late Seljuk and early Ottoman periods.64 
With the dramatic rise of the Safavid Empire under 
the leadership of an order heavily influenced by 
Shi’i traditions to the east of Anatolia, these tensions 
adopted a religious character as the rural orders 
adopted Shi’i traditions, such as the veneration of 
Imam Ali.65 Ultimately, the rural orders loyal to the 
Safavid state came to venerate its founder Isma’il as 
a messianic figure.66 Alongside this religious influ-
ence, troubles due to crop failures, plague, and rising 
taxation by the centralizing Ottoman state compelled 
the Turkic tribes of the rural orders to support the 
Safavid Empire, and in 1511, the tribes instigated 
uprisings across Ottoman Anatolia.67 The response 
by the Ottoman state was vicious, with the state rely-
ing on the orthodox Sunni ulema to condemn the 
rural orders as heresy, legitimizing massacres of the 
Turkic tribespeople that left tens of thousands dead.68 
By the end of the sixteenth century, the Turkic tribes 
and rural orders had retreated into the mountains of 
Anatolia far from the reach of the Ottoman state.69 
As the Ottoman state increasingly embraced ortho-
dox Sunni Islam after these wars, the isolation of 
the rural orders allowed them to develop the more 
systematized, distinctive, and hereditary traditions 
that would become modern Alevism.70
b. The National Struggle and the Early Republic
The demise of the Ottoman Empire and the 
proclamation of the Republic in the wake of the 
First World War seemed to herald a new era of rela-
tions between the Alevi population and the state. 
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The Turkish War of Independence, often known as 
the National Struggle (Milli Mücadele), crystallized 
under the leadership of Atatürk in response to the 
division of Ottoman territories by the Entente pow-
ers and the Greek invasion of Anatolia in 1919.71 As 
the nationalist government that would become the 
Republic emerged in Anatolia, the Ottoman govern-
ment remained in İstanbul under heavy influence 
by the Entente powers.72 The National Struggle thus 
became not only a war to seize territory from invad-
ing powers, but also one to wrest sovereignty from a 
state that had for centuries legitimized itself through 
military force and religious authority.
While the campaign against the Greeks revealed 
the military prowess of the nationalists, Atatürk 
sought to build religious legitimacy to cement loyalty 
among Muslims in Anatolia and abroad as well as to 
delegitimize the Ottoman Caliphate. To develop this 
legitimacy, nationalist elites frequently affirmed their 
loyalty to the Caliphate.73 Nationalist members of the 
ulema issued fetvas proclaiming the weakness of the 
Caliphate under European control, portraying the na-
tionalists as religious warriors fighting to save the in-
stitution of the Caliphate from infidels.74 At the same 
time, the nationalists surrounded the burgeoning 
nationalist parliament in Anatolia, as Küçük writes: 
“Debates were conducted on whether it was suitable 
to write verses and ḥadīths in newspapers or to make 
Friday a day of rest…Laws were made in accordance 
with the Sharī’a, such as the law to prevent the use of 
alcohol, and so on.”75 Although the Republic would 
later impose a harsh secularization, its foundations 
rest in religious symbols and collaboration with reli-
gious elites.
While such appeals targeted the orthodox Sunni 
ulema, nationalist leaders also recognized the im-
portance of Alevi support. Atatürk advised military 
commanders to forge alliances with Alevi authorities 
in Anatolia, and he even met with the two principle 
leaders of the dominant branches of the Bektaşi order 
at their man lodge (tekke), earning their support for 
the remainder of the war.76 As a result of this effort, 
the Alevi population largely supported the national-
ists, offering tekkes as spaces to support the smug-
gling of arms and serve as hospitals and mobilizing 
Alevis to fight in the nationalist army.77 Beyond the 
military effort, Alevi leaders supported the political 
project of the nationalists. For example, nine promi-
nent Alevi leaders from various orders participated 
in the first meeting of the National Assembly in 1920 
to demonstrate their political support.78 In return, 
Alevis hoped to witness the establishment of a state 
that would welcome them as equal citizens rather 
than condemn them as heretics.
Indeed, the republican state that emerged tri-
umphant from the National Struggle sought to abol-
ish the institutions that represented the relationship 
between religion and state in the Ottoman Empire. 
In November 1922, the nationalist government 
began to dismantle the Ottoman state by separating 
the Caliphate and the Sultanate and abolishing the 
latter.79 The Caliph was thus reduced to a powerless 
figurehead. Nonetheless, the Caliphate would meet 
the same fate as the Sultanate, however, with the 
parliament abolishing it on March 3, 1924, less than 
one year after the proclamation of the Republic.80 
The institutions that symbolized the religious identity 
of the state—the Şeyhülislam, the Ministry of Reli-
gious Affairs and Pious Foundations (Şeriya ve Evkaf 
Vekaleti), the şeriat courts, and the medreses—were 
similarly abolished. The Directorate of Religious Af-
fairs (Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı, hereafter referred to 
as the Diyanet), a new institution that represented 
the power of the state over religion, replaced them.81 
Upon adopting almost direct translations of the Swiss 
civil code and Italian penal code in 1926, the state 
completed the abandonment of Islamic law for West-
ern law.82 By 1937, laiklik, the aggressive secularism 
of Turkish thought, had become enshrined in the 
constitution as a central tenet of the Republic.83 The 
state no longer sought to implement religious tenets, 
but rather to restrain and control religion.
This aggressive secularization did not remain 
confined to political and legal institutions, but 
instead penetrated the whole of society. As Turkish 
laiklik drew its inspiration from anticlerical French, 
the state desired not only the removal of religious in-
fluences from the state, but also, as Ioannis N. Grigo-
riadis writes, “its eradication from the public sphere 
and its limitation into a very narrowly defined private 
sphere.”84 While some policies prohibited numer-
ous Islamic symbols and practices such as the wear-
ing of the veil in public, others imposed a Western 
lifestyle, such as the replacing of Islamic timekeeping 
with the Western calendar and international clock.85 
Denouncing the Arabic script used in Ottoman Turk-
ish as “incomprehensible,” Mustafa Kemal initiated 
language reforms that replaced the Arabic script with 
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the Latin alphabet and purged it of many Arabic and 
Persian influences, severing ties between Turkish citi-
zens and the Ottoman past.86 Moving beyond social 
practices, the state sought to crush Islamic institu-
tions with Law 677, which shut down the dervish 
lodges, prohibited Islamic titles and dress, closed 
tombs of Sultans and mystic orders, abolished the 
profession of tomb-keeping, and imprisoned or fined 
anyone who transgressed these laws.87 As such, the 
aggressive secularization of the state brought about 
a renewed repression of heterodox Islam. Krisztina 
Kehl-Bodrogi explains that after the reforms, “state 
trespasses on Alevi religious gatherings occurred fre-
quently” and “Alevi dedes, easily identifiable by their 
long beards and untrimmed moustaches, were often 
arrested because of illegal religious and ‘superstitious’ 
activities.”88 Among state elites, debates emerged 
surrounding the closing of the lodges and orders and 
the prohibition of Anatolian Islamic practices—fo-
cusing on a perceived disloyalty of the orders and 
thus more reminiscent of the vitriolic rhetoric of the 
sixteenth-century Ottoman state than the nationalist 
government several years earlier during the National 
Struggle—and shaped policy toward religion.89 Yet 
for many Alevis, this period of transition was a pe-
riod of hope as, after centuries of violent repression 
by the Ottoman state, nationalist elites reached out 
to the Alevi population and invited them to join the 
project to build a new nation founded not on Sunni 
Islam, but secular republicanism.90
c. Developments Since 1950
The urbanization and democratization that oc-
curred after 1950 fundamentally altered the place of 
the Alevi population in Turkish state and society. As 
mass migrations swept a significant proportion of the 
Alevi population into the large and wealthier cities 
of western Turkey, village networks and traditional 
institutions dissolved, leaving a weaker population 
in the less developed provinces of central and east-
ern Anatolia and a population without an organized 
community in the urban western provinces.91 As 
democratization in 1950 encouraged political par-
ties to appeal to a largely Sunni Muslim population, 
political parties, particularly rightist parties, came 
to represent Sunni Islam.92 Left in the midst of a 
predominantly Sunni society in the western cities 
and agitated by the return of Islam to politics, Al-
evis overwhelmingly joined leftist organizations that 
promised egalitarianism and secularism.93 Tensions 
between leftists and ultranationalists grew through 
the 1970s, ultimately erupting into ideological war-
fare that bloodied Turkish cities and sectarian ten-
sions in rural provinces between Alevis and Sunnis 
and Turks and Kurds.94 Many of these attacks direct-
ly targeted Alevis, the largest massacres occurring in 
Sivas in 1978, Kahramanmaraş	in 1978, and Çorum 
in 1980.95 As the government proved incapable of 
containing the violence, the state and society came 
to blame Alevis for this political instability.96 Seek-
ing to restore stability, the military staged a coup on 
September 12, 1980, ending democratic politics until 
1983 and leaving a curtailing of political freedoms 
that is long lasting.97 The state no longer perceived 
Alevis as a bastion of Kemalist support, but rather as 
a grave threat.
In response to the divisions that had erupted 
in the years leading to the coup, the military gov-
ernment adopted the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis, a 
theory of Turkish identity developed in 1973 by the 
nationalist and Islamist Aydınlar Ocağı (the Hearth 
of Intellectuals). Mustafa Şen explains that “[t]he 
basic assertion…is that Turkishness and Islam are 
two essential components of the national culture, and 
Islam is the best suited religion to Turkish culture 
and identity… Islam is the only religion in which 
Turkish culture found its best and the most correct 
expression.”98 Abandoning the Kemalist repression 
of religion, the military government sought to foster 
a religious camaraderie that could transcend the 
polarizing divisions of the 1970s.99 As such, the state 
initiated the construction of numerous new mosques 
and religious schools, increased its control over the 
messages given in religious texts and mosques, and 
mandated religion courses that taught a nationalist 
Sunni Islam.100 This welcoming of religion into pub-
lic life by the state enabled the emergence of political 
Islam, first indicated by the dramatic success of the 
Islamist Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi) after 
the resumption of democratic politics.101
A number of identity-based movements have 
emerged alongside the Islamist movement since the 
resumption of democratic politics in 1983, however. 
Among these movements are the feminist move-
ment, Kurdish movement, and the Alevi revival 
movement examined here.102 Erman and Göker find 
three causes for the emergence of the Alevi revival 
movement: “the fall of Communism… the rise of 
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Sunni political Islam… and the military confronta-
tion between the PKK (the Kurdistan Workers Party) 
and the Turkish forces.”103 Concerning the first, Reha Çamuroğlu writes, “socialism, which in the previ-
ous two decades had an indisputable authority as 
an ideological alternative for the young and middle 
generations of Alevis, lost its former importance.”104 
The Turkish-Islamic Synthesis contributes heavily to 
the second cause as the state opened space for the rise 
of Islamism and imposed Sunni Islam on the Alevi 
population through the construction of mosques in 
Alevi villages, the imposition of mandatory religious 
courses in schools that teach Sunni Islam, and the 
declaration that Alevis are Sunni Muslims with dif-
fering practices, thus politicizing religious identity.105 
As a sizeable proportion of the Alevi population is 
Kurdish, the emergence of the Kurdish movement 
additionally contributed to politicization.106 Having 
described the historical developments that have led 
to the modern Alevi revival movement, I will now 
conclude the chapter by describing the movement 
itself.
The population the movement purports to rep-
resent is divided along ethnic, geographic, and socio-
economic lines. While the majority of Alevis identify 
as ethnic Turks and reside in central Anatolia and 
the cities of western Turkey, Kurds comprise twenty 
percent of the population and are concentrated 
primarily in eastern Anatolia, while a much smaller 
Arab population exists in southern Turkey.107 The 
migration of many Alevis into western Turkey has 
introduced a new division between a rural popula-
tion confronted by the disintegration of their villages 
and an urban population building new institutions 
no longer reliant on village networks or traditional 
dede figures.108 This urbanization also contributed to 
a growing wealth disparity as the western provinces 
prospered while eastern Anatolia lagged behind, 
resulting in the growth of an urban Alevi elite as 
many others suffered from poverty and downward 
mobility.109 These divisions manifest themselves in 
ideological cleavages, represented by various institu-
tions in the movement, such as the Cem Foundation 
(Cem Vakfı), known for its loyalty to Kemalist prin-
ciples, and the Pir Sultan Abdal Culture Association 
(Pir Sultan Abdal Kültür Derneği), which preserves 
the leftist sentiment of the 1970s.110 The largest 
division exists between what Bayram Ali Soner and 
Şule Toktaş describe as the “traditionalist-religious” 
wing, which understands Alevism as a “pure form of 
Islam” and desires reconciliation with the state, and 
the “modernist-secularist” wing, which sees Al-
evism as “outside Islam… a syncretic belief system, a 
philosophy, a culture as well as a lifestyle constructed 
originally as the community interacted with various 
religions” and calls on the state to sever all ties with 
religion, although scholars recognize smaller branch-
es as well, such as a Sufistic branch and another close 
to Iranian Shi’ism.111 Nonetheless, Soner and Toktaş 
note that all branches of the movement “reject Sunni-
Islamic principles, interpretations and practices.”112 
In other words, Sunni Islam forms the constitutive 
outside that binds the movement together.
The leadership of the Alevi revival movement is, 
however, relatively homogeneous. Since the tradi-
tional village institutions disintegrated with the mass 
migrations of Alevis into Turkish cities and the poor 
languished after the collapse of the left, the urban 
Alevi elite in western Turkey and across Europe has 
built the movement, its institutions, and its iden-
tity.113 With traditional leaders unable to adapt to 
urban life, Vorhoff explains, the movement “was 
not realized by the traditional Alevi institutions and 
religious elite but by a new, Western-educated elite, 
via modern media and secular forms of organization; 
associations, foundations, concerts, staging of the 
traditional rites, public conferences and, last but not 
least, the huge mass of publications on Alevism.”114 
Sefa Şimşek thus describes the Alevi revival move-
ment as a “middle class movement” reliant on the 
“material and intellectual resources [of] the educated 
and better off Alevi.”115 This elite faces little competi-
tion as Kurdish Alevis often identify with the Kurdish 
nationalist movement, traditional leaders flounder, 
and poor Alevis support the egalitarian messages of 
the leadership.116 As a result of this poor inclusion of 
Kurdish, rural, and lower class elements, many accuse 
the Alevi revival movement of exclusivity. Erman and 
Göker, for example, charge that “[w]ithout acknowl-
edging the class division, as well as the ethnic issue, 
Alevi politics cannot be fully democratic.”117 Thus, 
despite the diversity of the Alevi population, the 
image of Alevism presented by movement leaders is 
urban, Turkish, educated, and middle class.
With their return to public and political life, the 
Alevi population has suffered attacks from Sunni fun-
damentalists. Whereas attacks before the 1980 coup 
were primarily motivated by ideology, attacks since 
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then have been driven by religion as Sunni mobs 
perpetrated attacks on Alevi communities in Sivas in 
1993 and Gazi in 1995.118 Further, the attacks have 
become more threatening due to the perceived com-
plicity of the state. Anthropologist of Turkish Studies 
Martin van Bruinessen explains that in the 1993 Sivas 
massacre, “[t]he involvement of local police and civil 
authorities in the violence was also significant, as was 
the inability of the central government to neutral-
ize them.”119 Similarly, sociologist and researcher of 
Turkish and Kurdish issues Jongerden finds that in 
the 1995 Gazi massacre in İstanbul, “police delib-
erately escalated a violent incident into a massacre” 
by antagonizing and firing on Alevi protestors after 
a shooting at a coffee shop popular with Alevis.120 
Examining language the police used, van Bruinessen 
asserts that, “many of the police were acting out of 
aggressive hatred towards the Alevis.”121 The period 
since democratization has thus left the Alevi popula-
tion with both a return to narratives of repression, 
but also the resources and levels of organization to 
address that repression as a movement. With this 
understanding of the history surrounding Alevism, 
the next chapter examines the Turkish nationalism 
that confronts the Alevi population.
IV. TURKISH NATIONALISM AND SOCIETY
Prior to the Ottoman Empire’s final century, the 
state made no effort to construct a national identity. 
Instead, the millet system divided the population into 
communities delineated by faith that governed them-
selves in accordance with their own religious laws.122 
With the reforms of the Tanzimat era (1839–1876), 
however, the Ottoman state sought to introduce 
a civic nationalism by proclaiming legal equality 
between Muslims and non-Muslims, abolishing 
the millet system, and replacing religious identities 
institutionalized by the millet system with Ottoman-
ism, a superior public identity.123 In response to 
these reforms, the reactionary Sultan Abdülhamit II 
(1876–1909) supported an Islamic religious national-
ism in an effort to strengthen the Caliphate and unite 
the Muslim populations of the Empire as national-
ist movements emerged in the Christian regions of 
the Empire.124 With the development of the ethnic 
nationalism of the German model, however, an 
ethnic Turkish nationalism developed alongside 
religious nationalism, with intellectuals building ties 
with Turks in Central Asia in order to construct a 
pan-Turkish identity.125 Describing the nationalism 
that resulted from these civic, ethnic, and religious 
currents, the Ottoman ideologue Ziya Gökalp wrote: 
“the Turkish nation today belongs to the Ural-Altai 
group of peoples, to the Islamic community, and the 
West internationally.”126
With the proclamation of the Republic, how-
ever, it seemed as if civic nationalism would triumph. 
Atatürk suggested so much during the National 
Struggle, declaring to the parliament: “I am neither 
a believer in a league of all the nations of Islam, nor 
even in a league of the Turkish peoples.”127 Similarly, 
the early Republic defined the nation as a “politi-
cal and social community formed by citizens bound 
by the unity of language, culture and ideal”—a civic 
conceptualization of the nation.128 Despite these 
declarations of a civic nationalism, however, the 
ethnic and religious streams of thought present in 
late Ottoman nationalism persevered. This chapter 
describes these ethnic, religious, and civic dimen-
sions of Turkish nationalism articulated by the state 
and received by the population, to better describe 
how Turkish nationalism affects the Alevi population 
and how Alevis understand the identity presented by 
the state.
a. Ethnic Nationalism
Despite proclamations of a civic nationalism, 
Turkish nationalism quickly developed an ethnic 
character as the state sought to present the Turk-
ish nation as a primordial community with ancient 
origins. To craft the narrative of this nation, Atatürk 
established the Turkish Historical Society in 1931, 
which developed the Turkish History Thesis, a fan-
tastical theory that asserted that the ancient Turks 
heavily influenced early civilizations across the 
world after their own ancient civilization in Central 
Asia collapsed due to climatic disasters.129 With its 
claims that the Sumerian and Hittite civilizations of 
ancient Anatolia were of Turkish origin, this theory 
transformed the Turks from a people that settled 
in Anatolia only in the medieval period to a people 
with a long history in Anatolia that stretched into 
time immemorial.130 The Sun Language Theory, 
developed by the Turkish Language Society after its 
foundation in 1932, offered a twin narrative, argu-
ing that all languages descended from the language 
of the ancient Turks, making modern Turkish, Hugh 
Poulton writes, “the most aristocratic, powerful, 
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lively and ancient of languages.”131 This reimagining 
of the Turks as an ancient race with Anatolia as their 
adopted homeland built a nation united by territory, 
history, and descent—an ethnic nation—despite the 
falseness of the claims.
As discussed in the first chapter, the ethnic na-
tion employs symbols that focus on this grand past 
and emphasize ascriptive characteristics. As such, 
the banks founded by the young republic bore names 
such as Sümerbank (Sumerian Bank) and Etibank 
(Hittite Bank) after the supposedly Turkish empires 
of ancient Anatolia.132 Similarly, the presidential seal 
adopted in 1922 and still in use today features sixteen 
stars that represent the “sixteen great Turkish em-
pires” that preceded the Republic of Turkey, present-
ing the modern republic as the culmination of a long 
history.133 The language reforms mentioned in the 
previous chapter sought to purge the “foreign” influ-
ences from the Turkish language by replacing Arabic 
and Persian words and grammatical structures with 
Turkic equivalents, imbuing the language with an 
ethnic dimension in an effort to distinguish Turks 
from the Arabs, Persians, and Kurds.134 Such theories 
and symbols were propagated throughout Turkish so-
ciety through academic conferences and institutions 
in which scholars sought historical evidence that 
would support the Turkish History Thesis, school 
and university curricula that taught these theories 
to Turkish youth, and museums that propagated the 
claimed linkages between modern Turks and the 
ancient Sumerian and the Hittite empires.135
As ascriptive nationalisms, such as ethnic na-
tionalism, cannot accommodate assimilation by out-
side groups, the ethnic stream of Turkish nationalism 
has proven hostile toward ethnic minority groups in 
the country. Resettlement laws in the early years of 
the Republic divided Anatolia into zones determined 
by ethnic composition in order to organize the re-
settlement of Turks into the Kurdish east and non-
Turks into the ethnically Turkish west.136 Alongside 
resettlement, the state used military service, “People’s 
Houses,” which disseminated Turkish values and his-
tory, and schools to assimilate ethnic minorities into 
a Turkish ethnic identity and transfer them to Turk-
ish areas.137 Repressive language policies now domi-
nate these ethnic nation-building policies. Article 42 
of the Turkish constitution, for example, forbids the 
teaching of languages other than Turkish as a mother 
language.138 Other policies—such as the ban on 
Kurdish in speech, cultural performances, political 
organizations, and other settings introduced after the 
1980 coup, and only lifted in 1991—expressly pro-
hibited minority languages.139 In order to belong as 
a member of the Turkish nation, one would have to 
adopt an ethnic identity defined by a shared history 
and common language.
This ethnic nationalism, however, does include 
Alevis in the Turkish nation. As nationalists sought 
to construct an ethnic nation, they viewed the Alevi 
population as representations of a genuine Turkish-
ness untouched by Arab and Persian influences.140 
In their efforts to reform the Turkish language, the 
nationalist elites thus adopted Alevi poetry and 
music, bringing Alevi poetry and songs into the body 
of Turkish national folklore.141 Nationalist elites 
similarly viewed Alevism as a reflection of ancestral 
Turkish beliefs and practices. To secular nationalists, 
Açikel and Ateş write, “the Alevi version of Islam was 
the least Arabized and the least cosmopolitan and 
one that kept intact successfully the ancient demo-
cratic traditions of the Turks.”142 To a state search-
ing for ties to an ancestral past, the Alevi population 
descended from the nomadic Turkic tribes offered 
those connections. Although the significance of 
ethnicity has waned, this stream of nationalism offers 
one pathway by which the Alevi population could 
belong in the Turkish nation.
Although the more extreme elements of ethnic 
nationalism have been gradually abandoned since 
the death of Atatürk in 1938 and democratization in 
1950, ethnic conceptions of Turkish identity continue 
to shape Turkish nationalism. Even with the end of 
fanciful depictions of Turks as founders of world 
civilization in the 1940s, F. Keyman and Tuba Kancı 
explain that, “the focus on the ethnic origins of na-
tional identity in the mythical motherland of central 
Asia persist[s]” in textbooks, and “the geographi-
cal territory of the state continue[s] to be imagined 
as ethnically Turkish since time immemorial.”143 
Even as repressive policies of linguistic assimilation 
have been replaced by gradual reforms, such as 2013 
reforms permitting political parties to campaign 
in languages other than Turkish and lifting restric-
tions on the letters q, w, and x, the state continues to 
discriminate against non-Turkish languages.144 A law 
that allows private courses in Kurdish, for example, 
stipulates that those courses may only be taught by 
native Turkish speakers for a maximum of eighteen 
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hours each week for only ten weeks, while a policy al-
lowing the Turkish Radio and Television Corporation 
to broadcast in Kurdish restricts such broadcasts to 
two hours each week.145 Although state rhetoric and 
policy are now moving toward a greater openness 
toward ethnic minority groups, continued appeals 
to ethnic identity and setbacks confronting reforms 
indicate that ethnicity remains a central component 
of the nationalism constructed by the state.
b. Religious Nationalism
Alongside ethnic nationalism, a similarly ascrip-
tive religious nationalism has historically guided 
Turkish nation-building policies as a product of the 
particularly aggressive interpretation of French laïcité 
adopted by the Turkish state. As scholar of Alevism 
Markus Dressler explains, Turkish secularism seeks 
to not only expunge religion from public and political 
life, but also demonstrates an “interest in control-
ling the content and boundaries of religion.”146 To 
accomplish this objective, as described in the previ-
ous chapter, the young republic both abolished the 
centuries-old religious institutions of the Ottoman 
state and reached into society in order to institute 
reforms proscribing religious practices and forbid-
ding traditional Islamic institutions. In the place of 
these Ottoman institutions, the state established the 
Diyanet, a large bureaucracy that seeks to develop 
an Islam supportive of Turkish nationalism and 
secularism, an Islam that Candas Pinar describes as 
“anti-clerical, Sunni (not Sufi or Alevi), Turkish (not 
Arab), progressive (not backward), and rational (not 
superstitious).”147 As such, David Shankland explains 
that sermons in Turkish mosques, written by Di-
yanet officials and delivered by state-trained imams, 
emphasize “the importance of belief to the individual, 
the importance of respecting the secular basis of the 
law of the land and the role of the mosque in foster-
ing a collective spirit in the community.”148 For these 
policies to succeed, however, citizens must adhere to 
the Sunni Islam espoused by the Diyanet, worship in 
its mosques, and follow its values. As a result, Sunni 
Islam has become critical to Turkish nation-building.
Much as the ascriptive ethnic nationalism de-
veloped by the Turkish state is hostile toward ethnic 
minority groups, religious nation-building policies 
are exclusive of religious minority groups. Popula-
tion exchanges between Greece and Turkey after the 
National Struggle, for example, transferred approxi-
mately 500,000 Muslims from Greece to Turkey and 
1,500,000 Christians from Turkey to Greece, reveal-
ing religion as the determiner of Turkish identity and 
reducing the non-Muslim population in Turkey.149 
Other policies similarly affirmed this relationship 
between Islam and Turkish identity, such as the rejec-
tion of the Gagauz Turks (ethnically Turkish Chris-
tians) and the acceptance of non-Turkish Muslims 
from Europe.150 Non-Muslim citizens at the time 
suffered intimidation campaigns, harsh taxes, and 
discrimination in the state and military,151 despite re-
quirements in the Treaty of Lausanne that the Turk-
ish state protect its religious minorities.152 Although 
recent reforms pursued by the state are improving the 
situation for non-Muslims, religious homogeniza-
tion persists as the state interferes with non-Muslim 
religious institutions, prohibits the training of non-
Muslim clergy, and allows discriminatory attacks to 
continue.153
Unlike ethnic Turkish nationalism’s accommo-
dation of Alevis, however, religious nation-building 
policies harshly reject Alevi identity. The Diyanet 
distinguishes its interpretation of Islam from Anato-
lian traditions through the construction of symbols 
of what it defines as legitimate Islam. The most visible 
symbol has been the mosque, which the Diyanet 
defines as the house of worship for Muslims regard-
less of sect.154 Turkish politicians show a similar 
regard for the mosque, illustrated by comments from 
AKP parliamentarians that “[n]either the cem houses 
nor mevlevihane are alternatives to the mosque.”155 
Açikel and Ateş explain that the state’s stance to-
ward Alevism is “similar to those discourses which 
perceived the Kurds as ethnic mountain Turks…the 
religious nationalists implied that the Alevi were in 
fact ‘mountain Muslims’ who had lost touch with the 
genuine orthodox Sunni tradition.”156 This approach 
has resulted in what Karin Vorhoff describes as “quite 
paternalistic attitudes, when [Sunni officials and writ-
ers] explain what Alevi as humble Anatolian country-
men, cut off from Islamic civilization and learning, 
got wrong in their understanding of Islam.”157 As 
such, Janina Karolewski states, “[t]he Alevi tradi-
tion is not accepted…but the Alevis themselves are 
considered to be Muslims who would be accepted as 
such if they only observed the obligations of Sunni 
Islam.”158 Without doing so, Alevism is seen as a 
heretical deviation, yet one that can be corrected by 
acceptance of the Islam of the Diyanet.159
105
the nation contested: alevi identity as a response to turkish nationalism
With the democratization of Turkish politics 
in 1950 and the subsequent adoption of the Turk-
ish-Islamic Synthesis after the 1980 military coup, 
religion has come to define the content of Turkish 
nationalism. Prior to this period, religion determined 
the boundaries of membership in the Turkish nation 
but not its content. As described earlier, however, the 
democratization of Turkish politics in 1950 required 
political parties to respond to a conservative Muslim 
population, thus reintroducing Islam into public and 
political life. The strength of this religious influence 
rose with the adoption of the Turkish-Islamic Syn-
thesis, which has been followed by a more aggres-
sive religious homogenization through the increased 
construction of mosques, growth of the Diyanet, 
and mandating of religion courses in primary and 
secondary schools.160 Islam is no longer an implicit 
component of Turkish nationalism, but rather a cen-
tral means by which the state defines identity.
c. Civic Nationalism
Despite these processes of homogenization, the 
state defines the nation in civic terms. Article 66 of 
the constitution defines Turkish citizenship as fol-
lows: “Everyone bound to the Turkish state through 
the bond of citizenship is a Turk.”161 Further, the 
Turkish Citizenship Law states that citizenship may 
be acquired by fulfilling certain criteria, none of 
which concern ethnicity or religion.162 Neither the 
constitution nor the Turkish Citizenship Law refers 
to ethnic or religious identity in determining citizen-
ship. Indeed, Article 10 of the constitution declares 
that “[e]veryone is equal before the law without 
distinction as to language, race, colour, sex, political 
opinion, philosophical belief, religion and sect, or any 
such grounds.”163 State rhetoric also describes Turk-
ish identity in civic terms. In 1931, Cumhuriyet Halk 
Partisi (Republican People’s Party, hereafter referred 
to as the CHP) Secretary Recep Peker defined mem-
bership in the nation as follows:
We consider as ours all those of our citizens… 
who belong politically and socially to the Turkish 
nation and among whom ideas and feelings such 
as Kurdism, Circassianism, and even Lazism 
and Pomakism have been implanted… We want 
to state just as sincerely our opinion regarding 
our Jewish or Christian compatriots. Our party 
considers these compatriots as absolutely Turk-
ish insofar as they belong to our community of 
language and ideal.164
Much like the civic nation that admits any individual 
who accepts the values of the state, this understand-
ing of nationalism in the early Republic seemingly 
admits anyone regardless of their ethnic or religious 
identity so long as they accept the language and val-
ues of the Turkish nation. Decades after these early 
proclamations, Turkish politicians still express the 
same sentiment today. From the earliest years of the 
Republic to its most recent, notions of civic national-
ism shape the official language of membership and 
belonging in the Turkish nation.
Similarly, many national symbols cultivated by 
the Turkish state emphasize the state as the center 
of identity. The Turkish flag represents the histori-
cal narrative of the establishment of the state—the 
field of red symbolizes the blood spilled by Turkish 
soldiers fighting against the invading forces in the 
First World War and National Struggle, during which 
the blood supposedly ran so deep on battlefields that 
it could reflect the moon and stars.165 Much like 
the national anthems of civic nation-states such as 
the United States and France, the Turkish national 
anthem describes the warfare that led to the creation 
of the state and focuses on the flag as a symbol of the 
country rather than describing an ancestral commu-
nity.166 The national holidays of the country also fo-
cus on the history of the state as they commemorate 
military victories, the establishment of the Republic, 
and the death of its founder.167 These symbols seem 
to depict a civic national identity.
As the analysis of Turkish nationalism in this 
chapter demonstrates, however, taken together, Turk-
ish nation-building policies do not construct a civic 
nationalism. The same state that proclaims it does not 
privilege one ethnic group over another continues to 
reject ethnic difference through repressive language 
policies and religious difference through assimilative 
religious policies. The same national iconography 
that contains the civic nationalist flag also contains 
the presidential seal that refers to an ethnic legacy 
of Turkish empires. The same textbooks that present 
Turkish students with the civic nationalist anthem 
also define the nation as, İnce writes, “a unity of 
language, religion, race, history, and culture.”168 Civic 
nationalism, while present in state rhetoric, is ab-
sent from policy as ethnic and religious nationalism 
guides Turkish nation-building.
The nationalism received by the population is 
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not only ethnic and religious. Undoubtedly, the pop-
ulation perceives these two components of Turkish 
nationalism. As evidenced, minorities have certainly 
been made to understand that they fall outside the 
Turkish nation. Similarly, the population responds 
to the civic nationalism found in state rhetoric but 
not policy, evidenced by protests against mandatory 
religion courses that utilize phrases such as, “[d]
emocratic struggle against sectarian education.”169 
A model of Turkish nationalism is thus not simply a 
model of ethnic and religious nationalism, but rather 
one that includes ethnic, religious, and civic national-
ism. As the identity built by the Alevi revival move-
ment is constructed in response to Turkish national-
ism, it is crucial to recognize this difference between 
the Turkish nationalism constructed by policy and 
that received by the population. With this distinction, 
in the fourth chapter I utilize the theories described 
in the first chapter to assess identity formation within 
the Alevi revival movement, drawing from the po-
tential symbols examined in the second chapter in 
relation to the Turkish nationalism described in this 
chapter.
V. RESISTANCE, ASSIMILATION, AND CONTESTA-
TION
Having examined the historical and cultural 
development of the Alevi population and the nation-
building policies confronting it, I now turn to the 
Alevi population and analyze the patterns of iden-
tity formation occurring within it. In this chapter, I 
address the question posed at the beginning of this 
work: Does the Alevi revival movement respond 
to the mixed messages of Turkish nationalism as 
an insider or outsider of the nation? To answer this 
question, I survey a broad range of symbols circu-
lated prominently throughout the movement in the 
iconography and narratives of institutions, the de-
mands and slogans of Alevi political actors, and the 
literature and art of Alevi intellectuals. I assess these 
varied symbols found across the movement using 
the framework of minority identity formation intro-
duced in the first chapter, determining whether the 
Alevi movement demonstrates assimilation, exit, or 
resistance. Throughout the period between the retreat 
of the Turkic tribes into the mountains of Anatolia 
in the sixteenth century and the mass migration of 
Alevis to the urban centers of western Turkey in the 
mid-twentieth century, Alevis largely pursued exit. 
But now, with Alevi actors and institutions growing 
increasingly visible in public and political life, it has 
become evident that exit has largely been abandoned. 
As such, I analyze the symbols and narratives used by 
the movement for signs of assimilation and resis-
tance.
a. Resistance
The Alevi revival movement is fundamentally 
political as it challenges the state. Although the 
reemergence of Alevi practices during the 1980s and 
1990s first represented an effort to construct cul-
tural communities by urban Alevis bereft of tradi-
tional village ties and suffering discrimination by 
the Sunni majority of western Turkey, this growing 
awareness of Alevi identity developed into a politi-
cal movement in response to the perceived threat 
posed by the dramatic rise of Islamism.170 Reflecting 
the politicization of Alevis in response to Islamism, 
the Alevi manifesto that proclaimed the movement 
with its publication in the newspaper Cumhuriyet in 
1990 accused the Turkish state of privileging Sunni 
Islam and demanded that it cease the construction of 
mosques in Alevi villages, remove required religion 
courses from schools, and promote a greater under-
standing of Alevi traditions in media and educa-
tion, among other demands.171 As the state has not 
substantively addressed these Alevi demands with 
reforms, demands for accommodation rather than 
cultural awareness or community building continue 
to define the objectives of the movement, as indicated 
by this collection of demands presented by researcher 
Fazilet Ahu Özmen:
Alevism must be accepted as an association of 
belief and must be secured against discrimination 
in all areas by the laws.
Compulsory religion classes must be abolished 
(the fact that the lessons are only Sunni Islam-
oriented in this country poses a problem for the 
Alevis.
Cem houses must be recognized as official places 
of worship.
The religion section of the identification cards 
must be removed.
Actual equality must be obtained by the laws and 
law enforcement.
‘Religion and ethnics’ classes must be excluded 
from compulsory classes and must be established 
as elective courses.
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Building of mosques in Alevi settlements must be 
put to an end.
Tekkes must be taken from the Ministry of Tour-
ism and must be assigned to the management of 
Alevi foundations.
The presidency of Religious Affairs must be 
closed down or must integrated [sic] the Division 
of Religious Affairs of Alevism.
The Sivas Madımak Hotel must be made into a mu-
seum.172
As described in the first chapter, the develop-
ment of a movement based on minority identity in 
order to demand accommodation by the state reflects 
patterns of resistance.
As the movement challenges the state and Sunni 
majority for accommodation, it has sought to empha-
size characteristics of Alevi identity that distinguish 
it from the Sunni Muslim identity it asserts that the 
state privileges. As such, Alevi institutions adopt 
symbols representative of Shi’i Islam or the heterodox 
Anatolian mystic traditions separate from, and his-
torically persecuted by, the Turkish state and Sunni 
majority. Similarly, the Alevi movement emphasizes 
traditions found in Shi’i Islam but not Sunni Islam, 
such as the mourning of the twelve imams or the bat-
tle of Kerbala, rituals popular in Anatolian Islam but 
not orthodox Sunni Islam (such as the semah dance 
and accompanying saz, a traditional string instru-
ment, music), and practices forbidden by Sunni Islam 
(such as the consumption of alcohol). Figures 1 and 
2, banners from websites for the Cem Foundation’s 
cemevi in Beşiktaş	and the Şahkulu Sultan Dervish 
Lodge (Şahkulu Sultan Dergahı) respectively, indicate 
this cultivation of symbols that draw boundaries be-
tween Alevism and Sunni Islam, with both featuring 
the Shi’i figure Imam Ali and the medieval Anatolian 
mystic Hacı	Bektaş	Veli and the Cem Foundation 
banner including images of the semah dance. 
Similarly, a poem written by a dede involved in 
the movement during its early years defines Alevi 
identity through references exclusively to those as-
pects of Alevism that diverge from Sunni Islam:
We (Biz)
congregate together (cem eyleriz)
We perform the ritual dances (semah yürürüz)
And play the ritual music (Saz çalarız).
We sing songs, hymns and incantations (Türkü, 
deyiş, nefes söyleriz).
We drink wine (Dem içeriz)
We mourn for the twelve imams (On iki imam 
yası),
We keep the Muharrem (Muharrem orucu),
And Hızır fasts (Hızır orucu tutarız).
We perform the yearly sacrifice (Yıl kurbanı),
The votive sacrifice (Adak kurbanı),
The social sacrifice (Musahiv kurbanı),
The sacrifice of atonement (Düşkün kurbanı 
keseriz).
We recognise no kadı (Biz kadı bilmeyiz).
Figure 1. Banner for the Beşiktaş cemevi administered by the Cem Foundation (http://www.cemvakfibesiktas.org)
Figure 2. Banner for the Şahkulu Sultan Dervish Lodge (http://www.sahkulu.com/)
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Do not ask our sect (Sorma sofu bize mezhe-
bimizi).
We recognise no sects (Biz mezhep bilmeyiz)ç
We say, “we have our path” (Yolumuz vardır, 
deriz).173
The institutions and individuals within the move-
ment thus employ symbols to construct the content 
of Alevi identity—its rituals, traditions, and icons—
while drawing sharp boundaries between it and its 
constitutive outside, its foreign other. For the move-
ment, that other is Sunni Islam.
Some symbols employed by the movement to 
distinguish Alevism from Sunni Islam have become 
politicized themselves. On the one hand, the cemevi 
and the dede are central institutions of Alevi identity 
and community formation. As the rituals and tradi-
tions of Alevism typically took place in private homes 
in Anatolian villages, the establishment of the cemevi 
in cities resulted from the need for new spaces to 
practice Alevi faith.174 As such, the cemevi serves as 
a location for both religious rituals and the articula-
tion of Alevi identity with publications, discussions, 
performances, and celebrations concerning Alevism, 
often open to Alevis and non-Alevis alike.175 The 
Alevi revival movement similarly reimagines the role 
of the dede, discarding its social and legal functions 
not suited to urban life and instead focusing on its 
roles in officiating rituals and serving as a symbol of 
social solidarity.176 But while these two components 
of Alevi traditions transformed out of need, they 
also serve as symbols of resistance. As the Turkish 
state considers the mosque and the imam symbols 
of proper Islam, the development of the cemevi and 
dede as symbols of Alevism challenge the Sunni reli-
gious dimension of Turkish nationalism.
As the state institution responsible for imple-
menting policies of religious homogenization, the 
Diyanet has also been challenged as a symbol of iden-
tity. As demonstrated in the demands of the move-
ment, a desire to transform the Diyanet is common 
across all branches. Alevi institutions typically either 
accept the Diyanet as a legitimate institution and seek 
the incorporation of Alevis or reject it and demand 
its abolishment.177 The Cem Foundation has even 
responded to the Diyanet by constructing its own 
symbol of institutionalized religion, the Directorate 
of Religious Services of Alevi Islam (Alevi İslam Din 
Hizmetleri Başkanlığı), an act Dressler states “chal-
lenges the monopoly of [the Diyanet] and is a reac-
tion to the state’s refusal to formally acknowledge 
Alevis and provide them with a share of [Diyanet’s] 
competence and budget.”178 This rejection of the 
Diyanet in its current form alongside efforts to ap-
propriate it for Alevi needs reflect the adoption and 
Figure 3. Above. An advertisement for a fund in honor of Berkin 
Elvan (“Berkin Elvan Bursu,” Pir Sultan Abdal Cultural Associates 
USA, September 12, 2014, http://www.pirsultanusa.com/)
Figure 4. Right. A banner of Elvan with the phrase “Berkin Elvan is 
immortal” at June 2014 İstanbul protest for the Sivas massacre
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transformation by the resisting minority group of 
symbols employed by the state or majority.
Alongside these symbols that distinguish 
Alevism from the Sunni majoritarian identity, the 
movement has developed symbols of repression 
by the state and majority. As explained in the first 
chapter, symbols representing repressive acts by the 
state or majority strengthen a social movement by 
building solidarity, legitimizing demands for protec-
tion, and preserving the feelings of outrage associ-
ated with the instance of repression, thus creating a 
more powerful and united movement. The massacres 
perpetrated against Alevi communities by national-
ists, and Islamists have become some of the most 
prominent symbols of repression, with the 1993 Sivas 
massacre being the most frequently mentioned. Re-
flecting the power of the Sivas massacre as a symbol 
of repression, protests occur across the country on its 
anniversary (as mentioned at the beginning), while 
Alevi institutions and leaders have long called for the 
Madımak Hotel attacked in the incident to be pre-
served as a museum in its memory.179 Alevis killed in 
these massacres and other attacks have also become 
prominent symbols, due to what Randall Collins 
describes as their representation of the “the moral 
power of the movement…the feeling that the move-
ment will ultimately win out.”180 During protests 
commemorating the Sivas massacre, for example, the 
names of those who died are often read and protes-
tors often carry photos of them.181 The Gezi protests 
of 2013, while not tied directly to Alevi issues or 
demands, have similarly produced martyrs adopted 
by the movement. During a 2013 protest com-
memorating the Sivas massacre, for example, Alevis 
chanted the name of Ethem Sarısülük, an Alevi killed 
in Gezi Park protests in Ankara, along with slogans 
denouncing the AKP.182 These symbols illustrate to 
both the movement and those outside it that the state 
and majority have proven hostile to the Alevi popula-
tion, and, as a result, the Alevi population must have 
greater protections to defend its practice and identity.
Berkin Elvan has emerged as among the most 
potent of these symbols. Reflecting the importance 
of these symbols in continued mobilization, Elvan’s 
death nearly a year after the Gezi Park protests insti-
gated widespread protests denouncing the AKP and 
police, featuring slogans that demonstrate the power 
of his memory such as “Berkin Elvan is immortal.”183 
As shown in Figure 3, Alevi institutions have adopted 
Elvan as a symbol of oppression and solidarity. Call-
ing Elvan “our brother Berkin” and providing the 
narrative of his death, the advertisement for a fund 
in his honor sponsored by the American branch of 
the Pir Sultan Abdal Culture Association proclaims: 
“May children not be murdered; may our children 
who are our future go to school and smile with hope 
at the future!”184 Berkin Elvan thus does not repre-
sent a single incident, but rather the threat faced by 
all Alevis that suffer from persecution. Actors within 
the movement combine the symbol of Elvan with im-
ages of the massacres described earlier, demonstrated 
by the black banner featuring an image of Berkin El-
van and the phrase “Berkin Elvan is immortal” hung 
at a protest commemorating the June 2014 Sivas 
massacre shown in Figure 4. By combining images 
of Alevis killed during the Gezi Park protests with 
commemorations of past massacres, the Alevi revival 
movement anchors its identity in an ongoing narra-
tive of oppression.
Such narratives of oppression are not limited to 
the years since the Alevi revival movement emerged, 
but rather reach far into history. The movement trac-
es the origins of the Alevi population to the Turkic 
tribes that rose against Seljuk and Ottoman rule and 
faced persecution, as described in the second chap-
ter.185 These narratives, Vorhoff writes, depict a
…society divided into two categories 
of people: on the one side there are the 
humble nomads, the modest farmers, the 
workers, the urban poor, the weak and 
underprivileged. They all appear as inno-
cent, just, good, righteous and at the same 
time as ready to suffer for their ideal—a 
democratic society based on equality, 
justice, freedom, and solidarity… these 
men and the common people are the ones 
who are discriminated against, suppressed, 
exploited and murdered by an unscru-
pulous caste of despotic, cruel rulers and 
rich, treacherous merchants… every past 
era has produced its heroes and villains, 
each representing the opposing principles 
of Good and Evil. In such a confronta-
tion, the oppressed appear most often as 
a non-Arab people, particularly Turks; 
the oppressors are Arabs, or ‘degenerate’, 
‘decadent’ Turks such as the Seljuks or the 
Ottomans.186
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To the Alevi revival movement, Alevi identity is 
thus grounded in the history of a people who suffered 
persecution by oppressive states that governed Ana-
tolia throughout their history and continuing into the 
present. Such historical narratives of oppression un-
der the Sunni majorities of the Ottoman Empire and 
modern Republic describe an ethnically unique Alevi 
people descended from the Turkic tribes, distinguish 
the Alevi population as the oppressed beneath the 
oppressive Sunni majority, and also incorporate Alevi 
preoccupations with class that linger from the left-
ist past of the Alevi population.187 Alevi institutions 
develop religious narratives of persecution alongside 
these historical narratives by placing the Alevi popu-
lation into Shi’i narratives of oppression by Sunni 
states. This religious persecution is often compared to 
present conditions, as demonstrated by this excerpt 
from an Alevi poem written about the Sivas massa-
cre:
The incident set the world in a state of turmoil,
Wasn’t there a military regiment in Sivas?
People were burned and there was dancing,
Why are you chasing [us], you bloody Yezid?188
As Figures 1 and 2 indicate, the central figure of 
Shi’ism, Imam Ali, is also one of the most revered 
figures in Alevism, figuring heavily into Alevi imag-
ery as depictions of him adorn cemevis as well as the 
private homes of Alevis.189 The movement interprets 
him as a symbol of resistance against injustice.190 
With these narratives, Alevis in the movement thus 
claim, Göner explains that, “Alevism [is] the cul-
tural echo of resistance to all kinds of inequality and 
injustice.”191 Ethnic narratives of the oppression of 
the Turkic people and these religious narratives of the 
oppression offer the movement narratives of resis-
tance against oppression by Sunni states and societ-
ies.
This focus on resistance as a central component 
of Alevi history and identity is found in other promi-
nent symbols as well. The Anatolian mystic-poet Hacı 
Bektaş Veli, widely venerated by the movement, is 
described as a symbol of the triumph of good over 
evil, a symbol of hope and perseverance for a long-
oppressed people.192 As Figures 1 and 2 demonstrate, 
Imam Ali, a symbol of resistance against injustice, 
and Hacı Bektaş Veli, this symbol of the triumph of 
good, are central to Alevi identity. Indeed, Kehl-Bo-
drogi writes, “[e]ntering the living room of a house 
inhabited by Alevis, colour prints of Ali and Hacı 
Bektaş will inevitably leap to the eye.”193 Similarly, Pir 
Sultan Abdal, whose legacy is celebrated in the names 
of multiple Alevi institutions and an annual cultural 
festival in Sivas, is revered for not only his mystical 
poetry, but also his manner of death—execution by 
the Ottoman state during the sixteenth century for 
rebellious behavior.194 Many of the legends that sur-
round Pir Sultan Abdal accordingly emphasize his 
rebellious rejection of the oppressive Sunni governor 
of Sivas and his loyalty to Shah Isma’il of the Safavid 
Empire, transforming him into a symbol of both 
Alevi ethnic identity as a member of the rebellious 
Turkic tribes and Alevi religious identity as a mystic-
poet.195 Reflecting the themes of oppression and 
resistance and Shi’i imagery that feature heavily in his 
celebrated poetry, an excerpt from one poem follows:
Ever enduring I die from this malady
If you love Ali don’t touch my wound
I devote myself to the way of Ali
If you love Ali don’t touch my wound
…
I am Pir Sultan, Haydar, we are Nesimi
Even from eternity we are given to the Shah
The twelve imams, our place of dwelling
We are martyrs and Ali our commander196
These symbols surround narratives of oppression 
with a past of resistance against injustice. The promi-
nence the Alevi revival movement gives these figures 
reveals the centrality of rebellion against injustice 
to Alevi identity. Indicative of patterns of a minor-
ity group resisting state and society in the pursuit 
of accommodation, the Alevi revival movement has 
portrayed the Alevis as a group long oppressed by 
Turkish states, but one with the will to challenge such 
injustices.
b. Assimilation 
Despite these patterns of resistance, the Alevi 
revival movement rejects classification as a minority 
group. After a report by the European Union de-
scribed the Alevis as a “non-Sunni Muslim minority” 
in 2004, the Turkish state immediately protested the 
claim, with both Kemalist President Necdet Sezer and 
Islamist Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan of the 
time asserting that the Alevi population is not a mi-
nority group but rather a part of the majority.197 That 
the state would oppose the classification of Alevis as 
a minority group should not be surprising given its 
denial of Alevi difference. Yet the Alevi revival move-
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ment also emphatically rejected this classification.198 
Some Alevis justify this claim by explaining that only 
non-Muslim populations may be considered minor-
ity groups in Turkey, often out of a fear that clas-
sification as a minority group would lead to greater 
suspicions that Alevis are not loyal to the state and, as 
a result, increased discrimination.199 Leaders in the 
movement have given an additional reason, however. 
Denouncing the classification of Alevis as a minority, 
İzettin Doğan, head of the Cem Foundation, pro-
claimed that, “Alevis are not a minority, they are part 
of the founding elements of this country,” a sentiment 
widely shared within the movement.200 Indeed, as 
the Alevi revival movement resists Turkish nation-
building policies, it seems to also assimilate into that 
Turkish national identity.
Although narratives developed by the move-
ment portray the Alevi population as oppressed by 
the Turkish state, it also describes Alevi identity 
as Turkish. As stated in the preceding section, the 
movement traces the origins of the Alevis to the Tur-
kic tribes that migrated into Anatolia from Central 
Asia and employs Turkic mystic-poets and rebels 
as some of its most revered symbols, constructing 
an ancestral Turkic identity. This narrative comes 
as a response to the incorporation of Alevis into the 
ethnic Turkish nationalism discussed in the third 
chapter. This identification of Alevism as genuinely 
Turkish does not stop at ethnicity, however, as Açikel 
and Ateş	write that “[f]or secular ethno-cultural 
nationalism, the Alevi’s understanding of the Islamic 
faith represents a specifically Turkish interpretation 
of Islam…[as] the Alevi successfully conserved the 
spirit of the ancient Central Asian and Anatolian 
belief systems.”201 Both Alevi institutions that con-
sider Alevism an interpretation of Islam and those 
that consider it outside Islam portray Alevism as a 
pure Turkish tradition in contrast with Sunni Islam, 
which they denounce as corrupted by Arabic and 
Persian influences in the Seljuk and Ottoman pe-
riods.202 The prominent Hacı Bektaş Veli Cultural 
Association (Hacı Bektaş Veli Kültür Derneği), for 
example, describes Alevism as a tradition founded 
in thirteenth century Anatolia with roots in Central 
Asian, Anatolian, and Near Eastern traditions, such 
as “Greek philosophy, Hittite and Mesopotamian 
religions, ancient Turkic shamanism, ancient Iranian 
Mazdakism, Manichaeism, [and] Zoroastrianism,” a 
tradition with the same roots as the Turkish identity 
cultivated by the state.203 The movement thus locates 
Alevi identity within the Anatolian and Turkic iden-
tity promulgated by the state.
The most widespread symbol of this identity 
cultivated by the movement is Hacı Bektaş Veli, the 
celebrated medieval mystic-poet. As explained, his 
image is a central symbol within the movement, 
found in Alevi websites, publications, institutions, 
festivals, and even homes. Elise Massicard explains 
that he is so highly revered for a number of reasons: 
Hacı Bektaş is a central figure of Alevism, since 
it is through him that Anatolian Alevism can be 
most clearly distinguished from Syrian Alawism 
or from the Twelver Shi’ism in Iran; he also per-
mits the making of a direct link between Alevism 
and Bektashism, which are quite different socio-
logical realities. Moreover, he is also respected by 
Sunnis, which is important in relation to outside 
society… he is also quite a consensual figure 
among Alevis, because most of the other figures 
of Alevism have a more precise significance: Pir 
Sultan Abdal is distinguished by a more left-wing 
connotation since the 1960s…204
Although there exist many competing narratives of 
his life as little is known for sure, the movement has 
broadly adopted Hacı	Bektaş	Veli as a symbol of the 
Turkish and Anatolian heritage of Alevi identity.205 
In addition to representing the triumph of good over 
evil, the Alevi revival movement celebrates Hacı 
Bektaş Veli for supposedly defending the Turkish 
language from being submerged beneath and extin-
guished by Arabic and Persian as he chose to write 
and deliver religious messages in Turkish.206 Further, 
although Hacı Bektaş Veli came to Anatolia in the 
thirteenth century, Ataseven explains that Alevi insti-
tutions and leaders understand his “love message” to 
be “specifically Anatolian,” meaning that “Anatolian 
Turks are more related to the Hittites than the Cen-
tral Asian Turks, which suits the Kemalistic idea of a 
clearly delineated nation with a rich cultural heritage 
specific for this geographic area.”207 Hacı Bektaş Veli 
thus links the Central Asian and Anatolian legacies of 
this ethnic Turkish-Alevi identity in one symbol.
Alongside ethnic narratives of identity, the Alevi 
revival movement also presents Alevism as central 
to the civic narratives of Turkish nation-building 
policies. As described in the second chapter, the 
Alevi population broadly supported the nationalist 
movement that would establish the Republic, hoping 
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that the new state would bring an end to centuries of 
repression. Although the reforms introduced by the 
republican state repressed Alevism, they also initially 
repressed public demonstrations of Sunni identity, 
suggesting an equality of treatment under the new 
state.208 With the incorporation of Alevis into politi-
cal life after centuries of exclusion and the destruc-
tion of institutions that repressed Alevism, the period 
of the National Struggle represents liberation from 
Ottoman oppression and unity as a nation. Excerpts 
from a poem by an Alevi intellectual from the early 
1980s titled “The Epos of the Liberation” (“Kurtuluş 
Destanı”) thus follow:
We were invincible, we became one and com-
plete,
We were undividable, we were together with 
Ata[türk],
Not as captives, if we had died we would have 
been free,
The brave men said [this is] the time and place, 
and they became heroes.
…
Our Ata[türk] said: “Let slavery end”!
“Let the enemy go [back] the way he came!,”
“Let freedom smoke in the extinguished 
hearths!,”
The hearths burned, his word became the prin-
ciple.209
As reflected by this poem, the discourse surrounding 
the National Struggle within Alevi narratives is one 
of liberation and national unity under the figure of 
Atatürk. The National Struggle represents a moment 
in which the population—both Alevi and Sunni—
united as it rose against the collapsing Ottoman state 
and invading foreign forces. Ataseven explains that 
Alevi institutions thus assert that “the Turkish nation 
owes its existence largely to the Alevis” due to their 
role in the nationalist movement.210 Indicating this 
view and the importance of the National Struggle to 
understandings of Alevi identity, Alevi institutions 
often include descriptions of the National Struggle 
in their websites and publications.211 As an integral 
component of the war that established the Republic, 
the Alevi revival movement contends, they are an 
integral component of the Turkish nation and not a 
minority group.
Owing to his role in the National Struggle and 
the establishment of the secular republic, Atatürk has 
become one of the most prominent symbols of the 
movement. As Figures 1 and 2 demonstrated earlier, 
his image is found on the banners of Alevi websites. 
As seen in Figure 5, his image is even found in ceme-
vis alongside religious figures, such as Hacı Bektaş 
Veli and Imam Ali. Illustrating the extreme impor-
tance his image holds within these religious settings, 
the heads of the Hacı Bektaş Foundation, the Hubyar 
Sultan Alevi Cultural Association, and even the left-
ist, anti-state Pir Sultan Abdal Cultural Association 
balked at a suggestion that portraits of Atatürk be 
removed from cemevis.212 This extraordinary rever-
ence for Atatürk comes from his symbolic role as 
the liberator of the Alevi population. Indeed, Kehl-
Bodrogi explains that Atatürk “stands for the end of a 
period which began in the time of Shah Isma’il, when 
Alevism became a community nearly hermetically 
sealed to the outside…the reign of Yezid seemed to 
be over” with “the disintegration of the Ottoman Em-
pire and the disestablishment of the Islamic ulema” 
he brought.213 There is in fact an almost religious 
personage attached to Atatürk. One Bektaşi poem 
written during the National Struggle, which uses the 
word nefes (“hymn,” used for religious poetry) in the 
title, goes:
He saved this oppressed nation from all the 
chains of slavery,
This is the hero of God who conducts holy con-
quests in a way that moves the heart
This leader is the revered crown of the world of 
Islam,
This is the decree of fate for those enemies who 
were after him.
Today the sun of independence, O Asım, rose 
over the world of Islam,
And showed its fair face; what a beautiful be-
loved.
Figure 5. An Ankara cemevi featuring the Atatürk, Hacı Bektaş Veli, 
and Ali (“Alevis divided on Atatürk portraits in cemevis,”)
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…This is just a prayer for Kemal Paşa [who is] of 
pure character.214
Such religious themes surround the memory of 
Atatürk in modern Alevi poetry as well, with poems 
referring to him as the “hero of the last days”, the 
Mahdi, or the “lion of God;” invocations of “[t]he law 
of Atatürk” and his sword in opposition to Islamism; 
and demonstrations of yearning reverence for him 
in poetry written using mystic styles and themes.215 
Some Alevis consider Atatürk to have been an Alevi 
himself, although many others do not support such 
theories. For the Alevi revival movement, Atatürk 
has thus become a central symbol as the liberator 
of the Alevis. By invoking his image as a symbol of 
liberation in the National Struggle, the Alevi revival 
movement locates the historical narratives surround-
ing Alevi identity in the heart of the civic narratives 
of Turkish identity.
Alongside portrayals of Alevi narratives of 
identity as congruent with ethnic and civic national-
ist narratives, the Alevi revival movement emphasizes 
Alevi beliefs and practices that reflect the modern-
ist principles of Kemalism. Secular nationalists have 
long upheld Alevism as an example of liberal Islam, 
despite their dismissal of aspects they deem archaic 
such as the dede or incompatible with state Islam 
such as the cemevi, illustrated by Pinar’s explana-
tion that “Alevism embodies many of the virtues of 
Kemalist Islam…and the general liberalism of the 
[Alevi] community, reflected in its stance on alcohol 
and gender relations, indicates a modernism that 
impressed Kemalists.”216 Even in its earliest years the 
Turkish state utilized Alevism to assert that, Erdemir 
writes, “the authentic values of the Turks were no 
different from Western values.”217 Embracing this 
positive reception by early nationalists, Alevi institu-
tions present Alevi beliefs as similar to the principles 
promoted by the state. In her analysis of modern 
interpretations of Alevi values, Vorhoff offers one 
particularly compelling example of this practice:
The central ethical norm of Alevism that de-
mands ‘eline, diline, beline sahip ol’ (be master of 
your hands, your tongue and your loins” refers… 
not merely to the banning of theft, envy, lying, 
telling of the secret teachings of Alevism, slander, 
adultery and intercourse with Sunnis, but also 
to the obligation to defend the fatherland (el), to 
preserve the (Turkish) mother tongue (dil) and to 
keep one’s own blood brothers (bel).218
Alongside such nationalistic values, the Alevi revival 
movement promotes understandings of Alevism as 
a tradition that represents progressivism. As Göner 
explains, since the rise of the Alevi revival move-
ment, many Alevis have come to consider Alevism a 
“universal religion…which defines itself in terms of 
universal values, such as equality, democracy, justice, 
human rights, freedom, cooperation, women’s rights, 
and environmentalism.”219 By characterizing Alevi 
beliefs as representative of modern values, the Alevi 
revival movement locates Alevism within the stream 
of civic nationalism present in state rhetoric.
This new focus on the modernity of Alevi 
beliefs and practices has even led to a redefinition 
of central Alevi symbols. Although Hacı Bektaş Veli 
is celebrated as a symbol of ancestral Turkish val-
ues and traditions, Vorhoff writes, many within the 
movement claim that his message of love “include[s] 
elements of every people, culture and faith that has 
ever flourished in Anatolia,” thus presenting him as “a 
man devoid of any racial marking, who was a master 
of synthesis… melding [these peoples, cultures, and 
faiths] into a deeply humanitarian, peace-loving and 
egalitarian faith and ethic.”220 The institution of the 
dede has additionally come under attack by elements 
in the Alevi revival movement due to its emphasis on 
lineages of descent, an institution many deem incom-
patible with the modern and inclusive ideology they 
seek to develop.221 Responding to these accusations, 
the Cem Foundation now offers courses that allow 
one to become a dede, redefining a position based on 
lineage into one anyone can attain.222 This opening 
of the institution of the dede signals a transition from 
ethnic, ascriptive conceptualizations of the dede—
and by extension Alevism—to an understanding of 
the dede that embraces republican and civic values of 
inclusiveness. This new interpretation of Hacı Bektaş 
Veli and criticism of dedes reflects the abandonment 
of attributes of the minority group incompatible with 
national or majoritarian identities as well as an em-
phasis on attributes of minority congruent with that 
identity, in this case a civic Turkish identity.
Although women are not readily visible within 
the leadership of the movement, Alevis identify the 
place of women in Alevism as symbolic of progres-
sivism and adherence to civic values in a conservative 
Sunni society. Unlike Sunni Islam, Alevism does not 
demand the separation of men and women during 
worship, nor does it mandate the headscarf; further, 
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as the Alevi population practices monogamy rather 
than polygamy and had lower rates of divorce, the 
movement claims that it treats women in a modern 
manner in comparison to the comparatively con-
servative Sunni Islam that dominates majoritarian 
understandings of Turkish identity.223 In an inter-
view, for example, Alevi activist Reha Çamuroğlu 
explained that, “if a male Bektaşi224 beats his wife 
you would be surprised. Because such a thing is not... 
possible in Bektaşism.”225 Asserting the historical ac-
ceptance of women within Alevism as well as distin-
guishing Alevi identity from Sunni identity, an Alevi 
institution based in Australia declares that, “[f]or 
over 2000 years women have been regarded as divine 
within the Alevi/Bektashi order” and attributes the 
suppressed position of women in Turkish culture to 
the “Arabic harem culture” that it claims corrupted 
the Ottoman Empire.226 Within Turkey, Alevi insti-
tutions demonstrate an open support for women, il-
lustrated by Cem Foundation’s dedication of an entire 
section on its website to issues and events concerning 
women.227 Through this emphasis on beliefs and 
practices considered more modern, the Alevi revival 
movement seeks to locate itself within the civic values 
supported by the secular and republican foundations 
of the Turkish state as it rejects religious Turkish 
nationalism.
Reflecting the emphatic assertions that the Alevi 
population does not constitute a minority group, 
much of the symbolic discourse surrounding Al-
evi identity indicates assimilation into the Turkish 
identity constructed by the state. In response to the 
embrace of Alevism by Turkish secular nationalists 
as a Turkish Islam untouched by Arab or Persian 
influences, the movement emphasizes the Turkic and 
Anatolian roots of Alevism. Symbols such as Hacı 
Bektaş Veli and discourses on elements of Alevism, 
such as its syncretic aspects thus describe an ethnic 
narrative of Alevi identity grounded in Anatolia and 
Central Asia and a religious narrative depicting a 
faith loyal to Turkish values. Understanding these 
Turkish values to be the modern, republican values 
of civic Turkish nationalism, the Alevi revival move-
ment assimilates into a civic Turkish identity as it 
identifies those attributes of Alevism that are congru-
ent with this civic identity. These processes of civic 
assimilation have also led the movement to renounce 
or redefine certain symbols. This understanding of 
Alevism as central to Turkish nationalism has led to 
an Alevi interpretation of the National Struggle that 
describes the Alevis as integral actors. As the Alevi 
revival movement locates Alevism within ethnic and 
civic streams of Turkish national identity, the process 
of identity formation occurring in the movement 
reflects patterns of assimilation.
c. Contestation 
At first glance, these findings leave us without 
a satisfying response to the question posed at the 
beginning of this work: Does the Alevi revival move-
ment respond to the mixed message of Turkish na-
tionalism as an insiders or an outsider of the Turkish 
nation? The analysis of Alevi identity offered here re-
veals an apparent coexistence of resistance and assim-
ilation present across all branches of the movement. 
On the one hand, institutions within the movement 
reject the Sunni identity constructed by the Turkish 
state. They emphasize those elements of Alevi beliefs, 
practices, and history that distinguish it from Sunni 
Islam with some even locating Alevism outside Islam 
entirely, reflecting a process of boundary formation 
indicative of a resisting minority group. On the other 
hand, however, the movement seems to assimilate 
into Turkish nationalism through the construction 
of symbols that present Alevi identity as congruent 
with ethnic and civic Turkish nationalism. Looking 
at this seeming contradiction, one might ask: Is the 
Alevi revival movement pursuing both resistance and 
assimilation? If so, how does this dualistic strategy 
contribute to its goals of recognition and accommo-
dation?
Perhaps the Alevi revival movement is pursu-
ing neither. Reflecting on the analysis of apparent 
resistance and assimilation within the Alevi revival 
movement undertaken in this work, I contend that 
the movement is neither resisting against the national 
identity constructed by the Turkish state nor assimi-
lating into it. Both processes require the minority 
group to recognize that it exists outside the national 
or majoritarian identity of the nation-state, that it 
is instead part of its constitutive outside. In many 
ways, the Alevi population is a minority group, as it 
is significantly smaller than the Sunni majority and, 
much like a minority group building a social move-
ment, seeks to construct an identity distinct from that 
majority. Yet Alevi institutions couch their narratives 
and demands in a majoritarian rhetoric that empha-
sizes Alevi belonging within ethnic and civic concep-
115
the nation contested: alevi identity as a response to turkish nationalism
tualizations of the Turkish nation while rejecting the 
religious Sunni dimension of Turkish nationalism. A 
careful reading of the symbolic discourse surround-
ing Alevi identity reveals that, instead of resisting or 
assimilating, the Alevi revival movement contests 
the meaning of the Turkish nation, arguing that the 
Alevis represent the genuine Turkish nation built by 
Atatürk and the state is the deviant that has veered 
away from this true Turkish nation and receded back 
into the oppression of the Ottoman period. I will now 
analyze together the symbolic narratives of resistance 
and assimilation described above to elucidate this 
process of contestation.
As described in the analysis of patterns of resis-
tance in the Alevi revival movement presented earlier 
in this chapter, the discourse surrounding Alevi 
identity is depicted in a dualistic framework between 
the oppressed and the oppressor. As Vorhoff explains, 
the narrative of Alevi history described by the move-
ment “evokes a kind of Manichaean world view…
the oppressed appear most often as a non-Arab 
people, particularly Turks; the oppressors are Arabs, 
or ‘degenerate,’ ‘decadent’ Turks such as the Seljuks 
or Ottomans… [that] no longer counted as Turkish 
because they uncritically adopted Arabic and Persian 
culture and despised Turkishness in every respect.”228 
To the ideologues of the Alevi revival movement, the 
Islam of this historical oppressive elite is therefore 
not the Islam of the Turks; as the preceding analy-
ses indicate, the movement asserts that Alevism is 
the interpretation of Islam that genuinely represents 
Turkish values. Instead, the movement contends that 
the Sunni Islam of these elites is a corruption intro-
duced by the Umayyad Empire. As one dede states: 
“The Umayyad family introduced political controver-
sies to the religion and they corrupted the Prophet’s 
path… Sunni Islam is the Arabic and Umayyad un-
derstanding of Islam.”229 To defend this claim, Alevi 
ideologues argue that Sunni practices such as daily 
prayers were introduced for social control rather than 
by the Prophet Muhammad and that the Koran is in-
complete as many references to Imam Ali have been 
purged, among other assertions.230 On the other 
side of this historical divide exist the Turkish people, 
represented by the Turcoman tribes with an ethnic 
legacy in Central Asia and a religious legacy stretch-
ing to Imam Ali. As described, the Alevi revival 
movement constructs this identity through narratives 
that identify the oppressed Alevis as the once-op-
pressed Turcoman tribes and symbols of Turcoman 
resistance such as Pir Sultan Abdal. According to 
these narratives, a bleak reality dominated for much 
of the history of this constructed Alevi people.
The Alevi revival movement states that the bal-
ance between the oppressor and the oppressed only 
shifted with the emergence of Atatürk as the liberator 
of this Turkish people. Indeed, as the poems provided 
earlier in this chapter demonstrate, Mustafa Kemal 
is not simply the founder of a new state, but rather a 
liberator of the Turkish people from not only invad-
ing foreign forces but also centuries of oppression. 
As such, the vice president of an Alevi foundation 
comments: “The Alevis have only come out victori-
ous once. We won one time with Mustafa Kemal 
Atatürk… Atatürk saved us from the sultanate, 
religious bigotry, and economic and political oppres-
sion.”231 The symbolic discourse surrounding Alevi 
narrative thus locates the Alevi people in the Turkish 
nation-state established following the National Strug-
gle and takes Mustafa Kemal as the sacred symbol of 
the liberation of that nation.
As described in the third chapter, Turkish 
nationalism during the early republic was ethnic, ter-
ritorial, and ferociously secular. The Turkish nation-
building policies and the fantastical theories of the 
Turkish History Thesis and Sun Language Theory un-
derpinning them portrayed the Turkish nation as one 
with origins in an ancestral Turkic people that left 
their original homeland in Central Asia to establish a 
new one in Anatolia. This early nationalism married 
these ethnic beliefs with civic nationalism by assert-
ing that ancestral Turkish values are the beliefs in 
republicanism and modernism that guide the Turkish 
state. As demonstrated in the analysis of patterns of 
assimilation within the Alevi revival movement, it is 
the ethnic and civic dimensions of Turkish nation-
alism that the movement embraces. Although the 
movement today considers this period to represent 
the liberation of the Turkish people and thus locates 
itself within this nationalist discourse, incidents that 
occurred under Atatürk such as the Dersim opera-
tion, during which the Turkish military massacred an 
estimated ten percent of the population of the prov-
ince to pacify rebelling Alevi Kurds, and the closing 
of the dervish lodges with Law 677, which continues 
to prohibit state recognition of cemevis and dedes,232 
make obvious that that the Kemalist nation-building 
project was not as friendly to the Alevi people as the 
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movement suggests. For this reason, leftist elements 
in the movement have become critical of this period 
of time and argue that the oppression of the Alevis 
returned while Atatürk was still alive.233 Nonethe-
less, such perspectives are marginalized, reflected by 
a broad denial that Atatürk was involved in incidents 
such as the Dersim operation while Alevis accept 
religious repression so long as all religious expres-
sion is proscribed.234 The movement thus locates the 
genuine Turkish nation within the nationalism of the 
early republic.
Because the genuine Turkish nation is taken 
by the Alevi revival movement to be an aggressively 
ethnic and staunchly secular interpretation of Turk-
ish nationalism, the movement identifies the reemer-
gence of Islam as a political force that occurred with 
democratization as the point at which the oppressive 
forces of the past engulfed the Turkish nation once 
again. Reflecting on the ascent of Islamism, one Alevi 
poet laments, “The Arabs drag the country into dark-
ness… [Atatürk’s] country is buried in darkness.”235 
Indeed, Köse explains that the most prominent view 
of the movement asserts that, “the Turks’ understand-
ing of Islam was Sunnified, politicised and contami-
nated during the Seljukid period, Ottoman times and 
the multi-party period of Republican Turkey, starting 
from the early 1950s and continuing after the 1980 
military coup.”236 As such, Alevis claim that Islamists 
are the heirs of the oppressive Ottoman, Seljuk, and 
ultimately Umayyad traditions..237 Reflecting this 
interpretation in a comment on the debate on the 
headscarf, one Alevi institution asks: “Is it not so 
ironic that today’s incumbent AKP government in 
power are [sic] taking Turkish stature back to the 
dark days of fourteen centuries?”238 Condemning 
AKP efforts to build relations with the Alevi popu-
lation through the Alevi opening, the chairman of 
another Alevi institution similarly declares: “It is an 
AKP project that portends new steps towards Sharia-
type rule,” the Islamic law abolished by Mustafa 
Kemal.239 For the Alevi revival movement, Islamism 
symbolizes the return to Ottoman oppression.
In its rhetoric and discourse surrounding iden-
tity, the Alevi revival movement thus responds to 
Turkish nationalism by locating Alevi identity as con-
structed through symbols and historical narratives 
produced by the movement within what it considers 
to be the Turkish nation. The Turkish state since the 
democratization of Turkish politics in 1950 is thus at-
tacked as an illegitimate representation of this nation, 
a state that does not represent its people but rather 
the forces that have historically oppressed them. 
To meet this objective, the Alevi revival movement 
emphasizes aspects of Alevi identity congruent with 
the ethnic and civic streams of Turkish nationalism 
that dominated the early discourses of the Republic 
while rejecting religious aspects introduced with the 
Turkish-Islamic Synthesis, reflecting a pattern of con-
testation that rejects this religious nationalism as the 
resurgence of Ottoman forces. Its political demands 
Figure 6. An Alevi protest against compulory religious courses in schools (“Alevis protest compulsory 
religion classes at Turkish schools,” Today’s Zaman, October 12, 2014, http://www.todayszaman.com/)
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attack institutions and practices that affiliate the state 
with religion. As Figure 6 shows, the symbols sur-
rounding political demands thus reflect notions of 
belonging in the Turkish nation through the Turkish 
flag and rejection of the Sunni identity increasingly 
adopted by the state through symbols of a distinct Al-
evi religious identity understood to be an ethnically 
Turkish identity. Although we may conclude that the 
Alevi revival movement is a movement of resistance 
that seeks accommodation like a minority group, 
unlike a minority group, the identity it constructs in 
response to the national or majoritarian identity is 
not one of separation, but rather one of belonging in 
a redefined nation.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Alevi revival movement thus offers a case 
study of the relationship a minority group may forge 
with the nation-state in which it resides. In many 
ways, the Alevi revival movement is a resisting mi-
nority group. With most estimates considering the 
Alevi population to compose between fifteen and 
twenty-five percent of the Turkish population, the 
Alevis are by no means an insignificant component 
of the Turkish population.240 Similarly, a long history 
of exclusion by Anatolian states that identify with 
Sunni Islam—the Republic included—and a popula-
tion hostile to Alevism indicates that the majoritarian 
community of the country considers the Alevi popu-
lation to be a rejected minority group. Indeed, even 
as the Turkish state claims that the Alevi population 
is a component of the majority, it only permits Alevis 
to enter the majoritarian community if they renounce 
aspects of their religious identity that separate them 
from official interpretations of Sunni Islam. The Alevi 
revival movement itself behaves like a resisting mi-
nority group, constructing an identity around those 
attributes that distinguish Alevi identity from the ma-
jority. Yet with assimilationist imagery and rhetoric 
also featuring in Alevi conceptualizations of identity, 
it is not so clear how the Alevi revival movement 
understands Alevism relative to the majority, to the 
Turkish nation. This work thus asks: does the Alevi 
revival movement assimilate or resist?
To address this question, I first examined the 
role of symbols in the formation of identity within 
states building nations and minority groups building 
social movements. This analysis resulted in a model 
that describes three potential courses of response to 
minority groups confronted by national or majori-
tarian identities. As I described, the minority group 
may assimilate into that identity by either renouncing 
those attributes that distinguish it from the major-
ity or identifying attributes of the minority identity 
with the majority. A minority group that does not or 
cannot pursue assimilation may exit the nation-state, 
abandoning the national or majoritarian community 
through either physical migration, secession, or a so-
ciocultural exit in which the minority group isolates 
itself from the majoritarian community. Lastly, the 
minority group may pursue resistance, forming a col-
lective identity and challenging the state for accom-
modation. Although the Alevi population pursued 
exit for much of its history since the massacres of 
the sixteenth century, with the formation of a social 
movement active in public and political life, it can no 
longer do so. But does this social movement pursue 
assimilation or resistance?
The effort to address this question took me 
through the historical development of the Alevi 
population in Turkey as well as the evolving Turkish 
nationalism that shapes the relationship between the 
state and this religious community. This first analysis 
of the history surrounding the Alevi population pro-
duced numerous potential symbols of identity that 
told both a history of brutal repression by the former 
Ottoman Empire and modern Republic as well as a 
history of cultural and philosophical development 
built on a foundation of syncretism and mysticism 
that makes itself known through a rich body of po-
etry and traditions. This second analysis developed a 
model of Turkish nationalism as it acts on the Turk-
ish population and is received by that population. 
This nationalism is one grounded in first an ancestral, 
sometimes fantastical, Turkish nation stretching far 
back into time and united by the shared language, 
descent, and civic values attached to that primordial 
identity. As the Turkish state democratized, however, 
it came to respond to the character of its predomi-
nantly conservative Sunni population. By building an 
identity defined by Sunni Islam, the state has con-
demned assimilative practices associated with its eth-
nic nationalism. With this shift, the Alevi population 
saw itself change from a perceived member of the 
ethnic nation as the descendants of the Turkic tribes 
to a part of the constitutive outside of that nation as 
a heterodox sect. Although such religious practices 
have always been present in Turkish nationalism, as 
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explained in the second and third chapters, under 
the early Republic, religion defined the boundaries of 
membership in the nation whereas ethnic attributes 
defined identity. In other words, before 1950 and the 
later adoption of the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis in the 
1980s, to be a member of the Turkish meant to be a 
Muslim, but to be Turkish itself meant to be part of 
an ethnic group reaching to the Turkic peoples of 
Central Asia.
With this transformation of conceptualizations 
of Turkish nationalism came the rise of the Alevi 
revival movement to protest these perceived changes. 
Indeed, one scholar of the movement comments, 
“What pushed [the Alevi population] into this situa-
tion is a fear that Sunni Islam may come to power.”241 
But does the Alevi revival movement respond to this 
changing nationalist discourse? Examined with the 
model of minority group response, the symbols and 
narratives the Alevi revival movement draws from 
its history, religious beliefs, and cultural traditions to 
construct an Alevi identity seem to suggest that the 
movement pursues both assimilation and resistance. 
Upon closer analysis, however, it becomes appar-
ent that the Alevi revival movement utilizes these 
processes of identity formation not to situate itself 
outside national identity and demand accommoda-
tion, but rather to situate itself within the Turkish 
nation and condemn the Turkish state as having 
succumbed to the historical forces that once op-
pressed this Turkish people with the reentry of Islam 
into Turkish public and political life. As a result, the 
Alevi revival movement identifies its identity with the 
ethnic identity of early Turkish nationalism while at 
the same time harshly condemning and resisting the 
Sunni religious identity that the state has constructed 
since the 1980 military coup. Emphasizing the re-
pressive aspects of laiklik rather than its assimilation-
ist aspects and describing the Turkish nation as an 
ethnic people once oppressed by Sunni empires, the 
Alevi revival movement denies the position of Sunni 
Islam within Turkish identity. Perhaps the Alevi 
revival movement pursues this rhetoric as a reaction 
to the intense assimilation of Turkish nationalism, 
which led the state to privilege discourses of unity 
and belonging, or perhaps it is out of a fear that 
identification as a minority group could lead to the 
same violent social, political, and economic exclu-
sion that has almost wiped out non-Islamic minority 
groups in Turkey. Regardless of the reasons the Alevi 
revival movement has chosen its rhetoric of belong-
ing in a nation no longer represented by the state, it 
is this symbolic discourse of contestation that defines 
the process of identity formation in the Alevi revival 
movement today.
As the Alevi population has become increasing-
ly prominent in Turkish politics, with both political 
actors inside Turkey, such as the Kemalist CHP and 
outside Turkey, such as the European Union, ac-
knowledging Alevi demands and calling on the Turk-
ish state to respond, this analysis of the Alevi identity 
formation is vital to understanding the dynamics of 
the Alevi revival movement. This analysis allows us to 
better recognize the perspective of this social move-
ment as it challenges the state so that we may more 
thoroughly understand the nature of their demands 
and how the Turkish state may pragmatically respond 
to them. Beyond Turkish politics, however, this pro-
cess of Alevi identity formation offers a unique case 
study of simultaneous assimilation and resistance 
that could assist us with interpreting the politics sur-
rounding “ambivalent citizens”—those citizens Açikel 
and Ateş	defined as simultaneously existing inside 
and outside the national identity constructed by the 
state—elsewhere.242 Moreover, it demonstrates the 
malleability of not only symbols and identities within 
a given state, but also the malleability of the nation 
supposedly uniting that state. As such, this work may 
hopefully provide a foundation for future research 
into the identity formation process and politics of the 
increasingly important Alevi revival movement as 
well as an understanding of the contestation of sym-
bols and identities surrounding minority groups and 
other sociocultural communities in similarly trouble-
some situations.
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